The Brexit Negotiations: Hampered by the UK’s Weak Strategy

J of Common Market Studies

2021

The defeat of Theresa May's Withdrawal Agreement in the British Parliament is often ascribed to the prime minister's precarious situation in Parliament and her inability to negotiate a deal that satisfied domestic stakeholders. But the contradictions of Brexit were always going to produce a least-worst agreement and patterns of support for the deal were largely invariant to changes in its contents. Drawing on the literature on ratification, this article sets out an alternative explanation for the demise of the Withdrawal Agreement. It argues that the government's ability to threaten MPs with a 'no deal' outcome placed the executive in a strong position following the referendum, and that the primary source of ratification failure was the breakdown of this ability over the course of the negotiations. This account helps us understand why the government was initially unwilling to seek the support of stakeholders outside of the Conservative Party for its Brexit proposals.

Section: The Course Of the Negotiations June 2017–november 2018mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Politics Of (Non‐)ratificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deal or no Deal: Theresa May's Withdrawal Agreement and the Politics of (Non‐)Ratification

J of Common Market Studies

2021

“…The subsequent victory of the Leave campaign in the 23 June 2016 referendum by 51.9% of the British electorate confounded the expectations of observers and pollsters alike and was widely regarded as a seismic and unexpected event, as indeed it still is (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020: 219). The selection of unity-candidate Theresa May as Conservative leader and prime minister in the aftermath of the referendum result surprised many, as did her decision to pursue a hard-line and uncompromising Brexit agenda, characterised by hard bargaining, anti-EU rhetoric, unattainable ‘red lines’, and an outright refusal to negotiate with stakeholders outside of the Conservative party (Jones, 2019: 28, 40). Fast-forward to early 2019 and the formerly hard-line May appears conciliatory compared to the Brexit supporters in the Conservative party and their collaborators in the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), whose opposition contributed to the defeat of May’s negotiated deal by the greatest margin in living memory (Baldini et al, forthcoming).…”

Section: The Brexit Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

Prisoners of their own device: Brexit as a failed negotiating strategy

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

2021

Brexit has occasioned a rightward shift in British politics as successive leaders have grappled with the difficulties of negotiating with the European Union and the vicissitudes of politics in the governing Conservative party. Explanations for the hardening of Eurosceptic preferences focus on the demands of ‘taking back control’ and the polarisation of post-referendum politics as key drivers. But they have not explored the ways in which negotiation strategies shaped – rather than reflected – domestic political developments. Drawing on two-level games accounts of ‘synergistic’ bargaining, this article argues both David Cameron and Theresa May sought to leverage Eurosceptic sentiment in their respective negotiations to make it more credible the United Kingdom would walk away if its demands were rejected. While both leaders failed to convey their resolve, they inadvertently strengthened Eurosceptic constituencies back home, contributing to the paucity – and the rejection – of their negotiated agreements.

“…British threats to walk away were not credible and failed to encourage any movement from the EU side (Martill and Staiger, forthcoming). The EU's failure to budge led to successive concessions from the UK, which was forced to compromise on sequencing, the transition period, the Irish backstop, questions of citizens' rights, budgetary contributions, and a host of other issues (Jones 2019). British climbdowns stoked domestic opposition (especially among Conservative Eurosceptics) and fuelled claims May had not obtained a 'good deal'.…”

Section: Biased Assumptions In the British Negotiating Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is a general consensus within the (still emerging) scholarly literature on the Brexit talks that the negotiations were a failure for the UK side (e.g. Dunlop et al 2020;Jones 2019;Martill & Staiger, forthcoming;McConnell and Tormey 2020). One of the main reasons identified behind the talks not going well was the problematic assumptions British decision-makers seemed to hold of the EU: It was assumed that the EU would make exceptions for the UK, that it would compromise on key principles, that EU unity would not last and national capitals would be responsive to bilateral initiatives, that member states would prioritise economic resilience over shared principles, and that the UK was sufficiently powerful to make credible and damaging threats.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bounded rationality and the Brexit negotiations: why Britain failed to understand the EU

Figueira

Journal of European Public Policy

2020

Research on the Brexit negotiations has linked the problems faced by Britain to flawed assumptions in the UK's perception of EU interests. These include the ideas that the EU would be open to compromise on key principles, that it would offer the UK a bespoke relationship, that national capitals would respond favourably to bilateral initiatives, and that EU unity would not hold. Yet the origins of these assumptions have been subject to little systematic scrutiny. How did such wrong-headed assumptions about the EU's interests emerge? Drawing on insights from bounded rationality we identify three aspects of the decision-making environment linked with biased thinking: (1) ill-fitting routines and lessons, (2) a lack of decision-making openness, and (3) a lack of EU expertise and contact. We demonstrate our argument using data obtained from interviews in Brussels and London in 2017-18 and accounts of those involved in the decisions.