The Burdens of Proof

Nance, Dale A.

doi:10.1017/cbo9781316415771

Cited by 52 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 162 publications

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“…I articulate two objections to the quantifiable balance model in footnote 38 and its corresponding main text. For further objections to quantifiable balance theories of epistemic support, see Cohen (1977), Nelkin (2000), Achinstein (2003), Ho (2008;, Nelson (2002), Littlejohn (2012), Buchak (2013;, Haack (2014), Staffel (2016), Nance (2016), Smith (2016), Leitgeb (2017), and Jackson (2018). For surveys, see Ho (2015), Di Bello (2013), and Gardiner (2019a).…”

Section: Three Locimentioning

confidence: 99%

Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk

Gardiner

2020

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The epistemology of risk examines how risks bear on epistemic properties. A common framework for examining the epistemology of risk holds that strength of evidential support is best modelled as numerical probability given the available evidence. In this essay I develop and motivate a rival 'relevant alternatives' framework for theorising about the epistemology of risk. I describe three loci for thinking about the epistemology of risk. The first locus concerns consequences of relying on a belief for action, where those consequences are significant if the belief is false. The second locus concerns whether beliefs themselves-regardless of action-can be risky, costly, or harmful. The third locus concerns epistemic risks we confront as social epistemic agents. I aim to motivate the relevant alternatives framework as a fruitful approach to the epistemology of risk. I first articulate a 'relevant alternatives' model of the relationship between stakes, evidence, and action. I then employ the relevant alternatives framework to undermine the motivation for moral encroachment. Finally, I argue the relevant alternatives framework illuminates epistemic phenomena such as gaslighting, conspiracy theories, and crying wolf, and I draw on the framework to diagnose the undue skepticism endemic to rape accusations.

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Section: Three Locimentioning

confidence: 99%

Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk

Gardiner

2020

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“…If so, the above interpretation would need to be further embellished. 18 Dale Nance (2016) presents a dilemma for the relative plausibility theory of standards of proof: If plausibility is to be understood in terms of probability, then the view is at risk of collapsing into the orthodox probabilistic interpretation. If, on the other hand, plausibility is independent of probability-is a matter of 'telling a good story' no matter how unlikely-then this is no basis for legal adjudication (Nance, 2016: section 2.3.2; see also Schwartz and Sober, 2017: section IIC2).…”

Section: The Base Rate Fallacymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The otherwise equal treatment of plaintiff and defendant is often justified on the grounds that, once an action has been initiated, the stakes might be regarded as equivalent for the two parties. Put differently, the two kinds of error that can be made in a civil trial—an erroneous finding in favour of the plaintiff and an erroneous finding in favour of the defendant—might be regarded as being equally costly (see, for instance, Allen, 2014: 199–200: Allen and Pardo, 2019: 9–10; Ball, 1961: 815–816; Brook, 1985: 297; Kitai, 2003: section II; In re Winship 397 U.S 358 [1970] at 371; for discussion, see Nance, 2016: section 2.2.1). Suppose a plaintiff sues a defendant for £100,000.…”

Section: Shifting the Burden Of Proofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Civil liability and the 50%+ standard of proof

Smith

2021

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

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The standard of proof applied in civil trials is the preponderance of evidence, often said to be met when a proposition is shown to be more than 50% likely to be true. A number of theorists have argued that this 50%+ standard is too weak—there are circumstances in which a court should find that the defendant is not liable, even though the evidence presented makes it more than 50% likely that the plaintiff’s claim is true. In this paper, I will recapitulate the familiar arguments for this thesis, before defending a more radical one: The 50%+ standard is also too strong—there are circumstances in which a court should find that a defendant is liable, even though the evidence presented makes it less than 50% likely that the plaintiff’s claim is true. I will argue that the latter thesis follows naturally from the former once we accept that the parties in a civil trial are to be treated equally. I will conclude by sketching an alternative interpretation of the civil standard of proof

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“…The Gatecrasher Case , the Prison Riot Case and the Blue Bus Case started a discussion that has been going on for over forty years, and is still going strong. The problem of naked statistical evidence has been addressed by a parade of eminent scholars: Tribe (1971), Cohen (1977), Kaye (1979), Williams (1979), Eggleston (1980), Twining (1980), Nesson (1985), Fienberg (1986), Thomson (1986), Wright (1988), Dant (1988), Allen (1991), Wasserman (1991), Posner (1999), Colyvan et al (2001), Stein (2005), Schauer (2006), Redmayne (2008), Pundik (2008, 2011), Enoch et al (2012), Cheng (2013), Nunn (2015 ), Blome-Tilman (2015), Nance (2016), Smith (2017), Di Bello (2018), Gardiner (2018), Moss (2018) and Pardo (2019). A number of different ideas on the root of the problem have been proposed, and several new ideas have been presented in recent years.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Naked statistical evidence and incentives for lawful conduct

Dahlman

2020

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

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The problem of ‘naked statistical evidence’ is one of the most debated issues in evidence theory. Most evidence scholars agree that it is deeply problematic to base a verdict on naked statistical evidence, but they disagree on why it is problematic, and point to different characteristics of naked statistical evidence as the root of the problem. In this article, the author discusses the merits of different solutions to the problem of naked statistical evidence, and argues for the incentive-solution: verdicts based on naked statistical evidence are unacceptable as they do not contribute in a positive way to the incentive structure for lawful behaviour.

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The Burdens of Proof

Cited by 52 publications

References 162 publications

Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk

Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk

Civil liability and the 50%+ standard of proof

Naked statistical evidence and incentives for lawful conduct

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