The bureaucracy of murder: empirical evidence

Abstract

In detailing the crimes against humanity committed by the Nazi regime before and during the Second World War, Breton and Wintrobe describe the Nazi bureaucracy as a flexible microstructure that zealously carried out the "Final Solution" to the "Jewish question". In this model of bureaucracy, superiors accomplish their aims not by dictating rigid top-down orders to passive subordinates, but by allowing competition among parts of the bureaucracy and trading "informal services" for "informal payments" over time. The present research adds to the Breton-Wintrobe argument by presenting anecdotal/empirical evidence showing how the murder of 6 million Jews was carried out in a flexible organization, wherein subordinates devised creative solutions to the "Jewish question". Also provides evidence detailing how the quid pro quo operation resulted in dramatic payoffs for those subordinates proffering the most creative and/or efficient solutions.Eichmann -like innumerable other Nazi subordinates -was a competitive entrepreneurial bureaucrat in a very competitive bureaucracy. It was this combined with his loyalty that explains his efficiency. And it is the fact that there were thousands of Eichmanns, all entrepreneurial and competitive and fiercely loyal to their superiors, that explains the terrible efficiency of the Nazi bureaucracy of murder (Breton and Wintrobe, 1986, p. 924).

The modern economic theory of bureaucracy as a precursor to new public management

“…7. Mixon et al (2004a) also provide some of the dialogue from HBO Film's 2001 movie adaptation of the Wannsee conference (Conspiracy) that supports the modern view of bureaucracy in Breton andWintrobe (1982, 1986), as well as the NPM model (Hood, 1991). One such line of dialogue is Josef Bühler's (secretary of state) pre-conference remark that the attendees ''will all discover what new concepts [for dealing with the Jews] our SS friends have in mind.''…”

“…' Breton and Wintrobe (1986) focus mainly on Adolf Eichmann's role within their conceptual model describing the ''terrible efficiency'' of the Nazi Holocaust apparatus -an apparatus that sought to provide Hitler with informal services related to the ''final solution.' ' Mixon et al (2004a) provide a significant number of historical examples of ''informal payments'' within the Nazis' vertical trust network that support a wide application of the Breton andWintrobe (1982, 1986) model of bureaucracy. Mixon et al (2004b) examine some of the ''informal services'' provided by Nazi functionaries through a programmatic example of vertical trust in the Third Reich bureaucracy of murder [1].…”

“…the SS) that were backed by threats. The judges' reaction was to employ a ''knowledge test'' that established guilt based on the defendants' knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of Hitler's monstrous aims when they gave him (and other superiors) their cooperation (Breton and Wintrobe, 1986;Mixon et al, 2004a). Breton and Wintrobe (1986) put forth the idea that the Nazis' murder of six million European Jews could not have been accomplished in such a relatively brief period by any organization(s) that fit neatly into the traditional bureaucratic model.…”

“…Breton-Wintrobe construct, modern bureaucracies rely on vertical trust networksnetworks wherein subordinates ''trade'' what are referred to as ''(informal) services'' to superiors, who in turn make ''(informal) payments'' to those subordinates [9]. Mixon et al (2004a) indicate, in support of Breton andWintrobe (1982, 1986), that such ''informal payments'' mainly took the form of rapid promotions, but could also include better offices, travel, etc. In the former case, Mixon et al (2004a, pp.…”