According to the widespread, neoclassical market ideology, market prices are not simply helpful, yet imperfect, reference points for consumers and profit-seeking enterprises. Rather, they are interpreted as reflecting the true value of goods. The hypothetical end result of the market process – the market equilibrium – is thereby assumed to be an ever-satisfied condition of the market economy. Based on this unrealistic presupposition, this market ideology maintains that the performance of managers can be evaluated from the prices of the (net) assets they control and, in the case of publicly traded companies, share prices. The share prices supposedly reflect the value that managers create for shareholders and, thus, the economy as a whole. If this were actually the case, the maximization of so-called shareholder value would be a socially beneficial goal for managers. The present paper demonstrates, however, that the ongoing re-orientation of corporate governance towards the maximization of values (as revealed by share prices) instead of profits (as determined by the accounting system) destroys the very market processes that coordinate business activity and allocate resources in the market economy.