The Case Against Moral Luck

Enoch, David; Marmor, Andrei

doi:10.1007/s10982-006-9001-3

Cited by 105 publications

(25 citation statements)

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“…3 El nombre se debe a Latus 2000. Para este tipo de argumento, véanse Jensen 1984, Richards 1986, Thomson 1989, Rescher 1990, Rosebury 1995, Latus 2001, y Enoch y Marmor 2007también Zimmerman 1987también Zimmerman y 2002, aunque su posición es singular, como veremos. de éste, dado que no somos seres omniscientes y nuestro conocimiento depende de la evidencia disponible.…”

Section: El Argumento Contra La Suerte Moralunclassified

El argumento contra la suerte moral: articulación y respuesta

Rosell

2012

CRHF

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En la primera parte del artículo se reconstruye detalladamente el argumento global contra la suerte moral en todos sus tipos, distinguiendo dos estrategias principales (moderada y radical). A continuación se defiende que ninguna de ellas es sostenible, pues si la primera resulta insuficiente, la segunda es impráctica y finalmente incoherente. Fundamentalmente se intenta mostrar que un argumento definitivo contra la suerte moral en todos sus tipos dependerá por necesidad de la noción imposible de merecimiento incondicionado, o merecimiento verdadero (esencial), en el sentido especialmente fuerte de función estricta del control del agente (o estrictamente proporcional a dicho control).

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Section: El Argumento Contra La Suerte Moralunclassified

El argumento contra la suerte moral: articulación y respuesta

Rosell

2012

CRHF

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“…If our moral judgments differ for two acts that are similar with regard to those factors that are in the agent's control, then we are affirming the existence of moral luck. Or, to put it another way, "where we realize that a significant aspect of a person's character or conduct is due to factors beyond that person's control, and we nevertheless continue to treat the relevant character trait or conduct as an object of moral assessment, then we are forced to acknowledge that luck plays a constitutive role in our moral evaluations" (Enoch and Marmor 2007). To make the point here clearer, Nagel uses as an example a truck driver who inadvertently runs over a child.…”

Section: Does Luck Matter?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Ticking Bombs and Moral Luck: An Analysis of Ticking Bomb Methodology

Stout

2011

Hum Rights Rev

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In this paper, I take up the task of further examining the ticking bomb argument in favor of the use of torture. In doing so, I will focus on some recent scholarship regarding ticking bomb methodology introduced by Fritz Allhoff. I will then propose a set of ticking bomb variations which, I believe, call into question some of Allhoff's conclusions. My goal is to show that ticking bomb methodology is misguided in its attempt to justify torture insofar as its proponents seem to ignore certain nonconsequentialist factors that are latent in the various types of uncertainty in real-world ticking bomb cases. Once this fact is recognized, I claim, the normative claims about torture that follow can be denied by appealing to it. I then argue that, even if we grant a certain level of uncertainty within the ticking bomb argument, torture is not justified. Rather, the implementation of torture, even if it yields positive results, is nothing more than a case of moral luck. In other words, the supposed "success" of torture in the ticking bomb cases lies entirely outside the agent's control. Thus, if the outcome of the use of torture is in no way controlled by the agent, then the agent's actions cannot be justified by appealing to that outcome.Keywords Torture . Ticking bomb argument . Moral luck . War on terror Most of us know, at least on some sort of visceral level, that torture is something that we ought to avoid. Despite this knowledge, we are still free to ask whether or not there could ever be a circumstance which could justify the perpetration of torture. For many, the hypothetical "ticking bomb" case qualifies as just such a circumstance. In his classic article, "Torture," Henry Shue outlines what I will refer to as the "traditional" ticking bomb case. He writes, Suppose a fanatic, perfectly willing to die rather than collaborate in the thwarting of his own scheme, has set a hidden nuclear device to explode in the Hum Rights Rev (2011) 12:487-504

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“…104-115) nicely argues that Zimmerman's account of moral responsibility presupposes the falsity of what I am calling the absolutely fair conception of morality.18 For a similar point, seeRosell (2015, pp. 128-129).19 Enoch and Marmor (2007) also espouse a modest version of Zimmerman's view, but do so in a way that differs from Peels in particular ways. Interestingly, Enoch and Marmor do not motivate their view by any explicit appeal to fairness; elsewhere,Enoch (2010, p. 46) suggests that appealing to fairness is merely a colorful way of stating the general anti-moral luck intuition.…”

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confidence: 99%

Moral luck and the unfairness of morality

Hartman

2018

Philos Stud

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Moral luck occurs when factors beyond an agent's control positively affect how much praise or blame she deserves. Kinds of moral luck are differentiated by the source of lack of control such as the results of her actions, the circumstances in which she finds herself, and the way in which she is constituted. Many philosophers accept the existence of some of these kinds of moral luck but not others, because, in their view, the existence of only some of them would make morality unfair. I, however, argue that this intermediary approach is unstable, because either morality is fair in ways that rule out resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck (and this leads to moral responsibility skepticism), or morality is unfair in ways that permit the existence of those kinds of moral luck. Thus, such intermediary approaches lack the motivation that their proponents have long taken them to have. In the appendix, I point to ways in which morality is unfair concerning the scope of moral responsibility, moral obligation, moral taint, being a good or bad person, and flourishing. Keywords Moral luck Á Luck Á Moral responsibility Á Free will Á Fairness Á Morality Á Taking responsibility Á Moral taint Á Flourishing Moral luck occurs when factors beyond an agent's control positively affect the degree of praise or blame she deserves. 1 Kinds of moral luck are differentiated by

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The Case Against Moral Luck

Cited by 105 publications

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El argumento contra la suerte moral: articulación y respuesta

El argumento contra la suerte moral: articulación y respuesta

Ticking Bombs and Moral Luck: An Analysis of Ticking Bomb Methodology

Moral luck and the unfairness of morality

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