The Case for Markets in Citizenship

Abstract

A number of countries sell citizenship rights to foreign buyers. Gary Becker makes an economic case for the state's sale of citizenship; more recently, Javier Hidalgo has offered a moral defence. However, the private sale of citizenship on a market remains largely unexplored and undefended. This article argues that under certain conditions states ought to permit their citizens to swap citizenship rights with foreigners in exchange for payment. I begin by offering two defeasible reasons to legalize citizenship markets: they would enable mutually beneficial exchange and increase the labour market opportunities of the global poor. I consider a number of counterarguments and conclude that none are dispositive, leaving the case for citizenship markets undefeated.

Not Yours to Sell: The Case Against Private Citizenship Markets

“…In the second and distinct line of argument offered in the literature, proponents of private citizenship markets support their case by pointing to a myriad of positive ethical and institutional consequences of selling citizenship, for example:• That the marketization of citizenship will provide a new source of revenue for states, with the added effect of diminished vetting and enforcement costs (Tullock 1997, 252; Muaddi 2006, 271; Webb 2014, 33; Johnson 2018, 988).• That making citizenship a saleable commodity will incentivize states to govern more justly and effectively, as to increase the value of the “product” (Muaddi 2006, 272; Webb 2014, 33).• That selling citizenship will generate a more patriotic citizenry, as people invest resources in their citizenship would be more committed to the success of the enterprise (Tullock 1997, 252; Webb 2014, 33).• That selling citizenship is a fairer and less arbitrary immigration policy, compared to existing criteria (Tullock 1997, 252; Webb 2014, 34; Freiman 2019, 132).• That selling citizenship will mitigate the inequality between developed and less-developed states, adding to global welfare (Webb 2014, 34; Johnson 2018, 986–87; Freiman 2019, 126–27).…”

“…• That selling citizenship is a fairer and less arbitrary immigration policy, compared to existing criteria (Tullock 1997, 252; Webb 2014, 34; Freiman 2019, 132).…”

“…• That selling citizenship will mitigate the inequality between developed and less-developed states, adding to global welfare (Webb 2014, 34; Johnson 2018, 986–87; Freiman 2019, 126–27).…”

“…Defenders of private citizenship markets might assume that the problem I articulated could be resolved through proper regulation of the market. Freiman, for example, writes that he takes “no stand on the correct account of admissions criteria” and merely argues that “so long as a foreigner meets your own favoured conditions for entry (whatever they are), the state should not interfere with her purchase of citizenship from an existing citizen”(Freiman 2019, 125). In other words, if the problem I identified is one of legitimacy borne out a lack of democratic authorization, why could not the solution be to democratically authorize private citizenship markets?…”

“…Recently, several scholars have made the case for a radical transformation of this status-quo, and in support of private citizenship markets (Freiman 2019; Hanson 2020; Johnson 2018; Muaddi 2006; Webb 2014). 1 In this section, I focus on the two most prominent lines of argument in support of this proposal—respectively, drawing on the permissibility of existing citizenship-by-investment policies to justify the establishment of private citizenship markets, and pointing to positive consequences of establishing these markets.…”