The central assignment game and the assignment markets

Kaneko, Mamoru

doi:10.1016/0304-4068(82)90038-6

Cited by 131 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The former respect is crucial in this paper. Kaneko [14] and Kaneko-Yamamoto [13] proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium for this housing market model. 3 …”

Section: General Formulationmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Assumption D may be interpreted as meaning that the variety of apartments in (M, N ) is not so large that the difference between any two apartments may be compensated by an increase requires each landlord to produce at most one unit in the model of the present paper (see Kaneko [14]). The existence of a maximal rent vector is expected from these facts.…”

Section: Specific Assumptions On the Rental Housing Market (M N )mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Duality in comparative statics in rental housing markets with indivisibilities

Kaneko

Ito

Osawa

2006

Journal of Urban Economics

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We present certain duality results on comparative statics on competitive rent vectors in the rental housing market model. In the model, apartments as indivisible goods are classified into a finite number of categories, and are traded for one composite commodity. Our concern is about certain general properties of the behavior of rents with parameter changes. In particular, the rent changes are intimately related to the boundary income changes of the categories of apartments. Both changes are endogenously determined in equilibrium. We will show that these changes exhibit nice dual structures. We will also apply our model and comparative statics to a rental housing market in the Tokyo metropolitan area.  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.JEL classification: R31; R30; D58

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“…The former respect is crucial in this paper. Kaneko [14] and Kaneko-Yamamoto [13] proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium for this housing market model. 3 …”

Section: General Formulationmentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Specific Assumptions On the Rental Housing Market (M N )mentioning

confidence: 99%

Duality in comparative statics in rental housing markets with indivisibilities

Kaneko

Ito

Osawa

2006

Journal of Urban Economics

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“…The basic idea is that a marriage may bring utility gains to both parts involved, relative to the utility as singles. For various economic interpretations see Kaneko (1982), Rochford (1984) or Demange, Gale (1985).…”

Section: Ntu Assignment Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Without being complete we quote some of the papers: Shapley, Shubik (1971), Shapley, Scarf (1974), Crawford, Knoer (1981), Kaneko (1982), Kelso, Crawford (1982), Quinzii (1984), Roth (1984), Rochford (1984), Demange, Gale (1985), Crawford, Rochford (1986), and finally the excellent book of Roth and Sotomayor (1990).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments

Moldovanu

1990

Int J Game Theory

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Abstract:We consider NTU assignment games, which are generalizations of two-sided markets. Matched pairs bargain over feasible allocations; the disagreement outcome is endogenuously determined, taking in account outside options which are based on the current payoff of other players. An allocation is in equilibrium if and only if each pair is in equilibrium (no player wishes to rebargain). The set of equilibria is not empty and it naturally generalizes the intersection of the core and prekernel of TU assignment games. A set with similar properties does not exist for general NTU games. The main source of technical difficulties is the relatively complicated structure of the core in NTU games. We make a strong use of reduced games and consistency requirements. We generalize also the results obtained by Rochford (1984) for TU assignment games.

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“…Crawford and Knoer (1981) introduced one of these mechanisms, which is a generalization of the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962). Quinze (1984), Kaneko (1982), Kaneko and Yoshitsugu (1986), Alkan (1988), Alkan (1992) and Alkan and Gale (1988) prove the existence of competitive equilibria in a more general model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand

Sotomayor¹

2002

Rev. Bras. Econ.

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Summary: 1. Introduction; 2. The competitive market and the auction mechanism; 3. The main results; 4. Concluding remarks.Keywords: auction mechanism; competitive equilibrium; demand set.JEL codes: C78 and D78. This paper proposes a new descending bid method for auctioning multiple objects. The auctioneer announces a current price, bidders indicate their demands at that price, and the auctioneer lowers the prices until every object can be allocated to a buyer who demands it and no buyer receives more than one item. The features of this mechanism lie on the facts that: the objects are sold simultaneously at prices that clear the market; every two similar objects are sold at the same price; the mechanism always produces the same final price, namely, the maximum competitive equilibrium price. In addition, the auctioneer can choose an efficient allocation.Este artigo propõe um novo método de lances descendentes para leiloar múltiplos objetos com demanda unitária. O leiloeiro anuncia um preço, os compradores indicam suas demandas ao preço anunciado, e o leiloeiro desce os preços até que todo objeto esteja alocado para algum comprador que o tenha demandado e ninguém esteja comprando mais do que um item. Os aspectos importantes deste mecanismo são que os objetos são vendidos simultaneamente a preços competitivos, quaisquer dois objetos similares são vendidos ao mesmo preço e independentemente das escolhas do leiloeiro o mecanismo sempre produz o mesmo preço final, o preço máximo de equilíbrio competitivo. Além disso,é sempre possível para o leiloeiro escolher uma alocação eficiente.

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The central assignment game and the assignment markets

Cited by 131 publications

References 8 publications

Duality in comparative statics in rental housing markets with indivisibilities

Duality in comparative statics in rental housing markets with indivisibilities

Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments

A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand

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