The CEO Horizon Problem and Managerial Slack in China

Fang, Junxiong; He, Lerong; Conyon, Martin J.

doi:10.1017/mor.2017.57

Cited by 10 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 105 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This finding is in supports of Baik et al (2011) and Zouari et al (2015), who show that longer serving managers use the opportunity to engage in managing the reporting earnings. The results are also consistent with outcome of Fang et al (2018) who find that managerial slack turned to increase in CEO's final years in office.…”

Section: Regression Resultssupporting

confidence: 87%

CEO discretion, political connection and real earnings management in Nigeria

Sani¹,

Latif

Al‐Dhamari

2020

MRR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of CEO discretion on the real earnings management and to explore whether the discretion of the CEO to ensure accurate and reliable financial reports is influenced by the political connection of board members. Design/methodology/approach Using the generalized method of movement to control the potential endogeneity on the sample of listed companies in Nigeria, the study conducted several checks using Driscoll–Kraay panel data regression with standard error to robust the main findings. Findings The paper provides evidence that CEO Discretion reduces the tendency of real earnings management and improve the reporting quality. However, the CEO’s discretion to provide reliable financial reports and to reduce the likely earnings manipulation is overturn by the presence of politically connected directors. Originality/value Existing studies on CEO attributes and earnings management in Nigeria fail to explain why CEOs were involved in corporate financial scandals. This paper suggests that the presence of politically connected directors is what override and upturn the CEO discretion to dwell into real earnings manipulations. Prior studies measured political connection using a dummy variable (Chaney et al., 2011; Osazuwa et al., 2016; Tee, 2018), this paper measured political connection using the proportion of politically connected directors. This is on the idea that the presence of more politically connected directors may give them the power to override the CEOs decision.

show abstract

Section: Regression Resultssupporting

confidence: 87%

CEO discretion, political connection and real earnings management in Nigeria

Sani¹,

Latif

Al‐Dhamari

2020

MRR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Hence, this study examines whether firms with listed or non-listed GDRs/ADRs attract more foreign investors in Pakistan. Klapper et al (2006) suggest that if the country-level governance conditions are substandard, then firm-level corporate governance matters more for the investors since effective corporate governance mechanism in a firm reduces the likelihoods of expropriation by firm managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997;Fang et al, 2018;Sch€ auble, 2019). In a similar vein, Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that foreign institutional investors have a strong tendency for the stock of firms with good corporate governance.…”

Section: Determinants Of Foreign Investment In Pakistanmentioning

confidence: 92%

Determinants of foreign investment in Pakistan

Ullah

Tahir

2020

SAJBS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the effect of country- and firm-specific factors on foreign investment in Pakistan.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses time-series data for country-level determinants and uses panel data for 100 listed non-financial companies selected based on market capitalisation from 2005 to 2015.FindingsFindings suggest that the stock market returns and liquidity of the country significantly positively influence the foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in Pakistan. Whereas, economic growth surprisingly is negatively related to foreign portfolio investment. In addition, findings reveal that firm size, financial leverage, dividend yield and global depositary receipts (GDR) have a positive impact on the total foreign investment at firm level. Further, foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in those firms that are large, pay high dividends and issue GDR. Furthermore, findings suggest that foreign direct investors tend to invest in firms that are financially leveraged and have low capital gain yield.Practical implicationsAt the country level, this study recommends that stock market performance, economic growth and foreign reserves of the country should be maintained and improved to attract FPI. At the firm level, this study recommends issuance of global depositary receipts and high dividend payouts for those firms that are interested in institutional investment in Pakistan.Originality/valueTo the best of authors' knowledge, this study is the first that examines the effect of firm-level factors along with country-level factors on foreign investment in Pakistan.

show abstract

“…The manager-owner agency problem is serious in Chinese SOEs ( Fan et al, 2007 ; Fang et al, 2018 ). Under this institutional context and combined with the above analysis, we propose the first hypothesis:…”

Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our findings also imply that in SOEs, CFOs’ functionally diverse experience leads to their lack of identity as heads of accounting departments and makes the CFOs more like political officials rather than professional managers ( Hu and Xu, 2021 ). Many scholars have found that, in China, CEOs with different labels have different impacts on firms’ financial policies ( Fan et al, 2007 ; Li and Qian, 2013 ), especially for those at SOEs ( Xie, 2015 ; Fang et al, 2018 ; Lou et al, 2021 ). This paper thus expands the research scope and provides an understanding of other executives in Chinese SOEs.…”

Section: Summary and Commentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Chief Financial Officer Functional Diversity and the Timeliness of Annual Reports: A Comparative Study of Firms With Different Ownership Types

Huang

2022

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Functional diversity is related to functional areas in which CFOs are experienced. It reflects their number of general managerial skills or social ties to some extent. In this paper, we try to examine whether there is an association between CFO functional diversity and the timeliness of annual reports. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2017, we found that in state-owned enterprises, there is a negative relationship between this diversity and timeliness. However, the promotion incentive of CFOs with functionally diverse experience can weaken this negative relationship. We also found that there is a positive relationship between the two factors in private enterprises whose offices are headquartered in regions with a low degree of marketization. We use difference-in-differences method to test the hypotheses again. The conclusions remain robust.

show abstract

The CEO Horizon Problem and Managerial Slack in China

Cited by 10 publications

References 105 publications

CEO discretion, political connection and real earnings management in Nigeria

CEO discretion, political connection and real earnings management in Nigeria

Determinants of foreign investment in Pakistan

Chief Financial Officer Functional Diversity and the Timeliness of Annual Reports: A Comparative Study of Firms With Different Ownership Types

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About