The Chameleon Effect: Beyond the Bonding Hypothesis for Cross-Listed Securities

Jordan, Cally

doi:10.2139/ssrn.901768

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 15 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Other studies question why firms already operating in jurisdictions with a common law regime and concomitant strong investor protections would want to rent similar law by crosslisting. Jordan (2006) raises this question for Canadian firms listing in the US and Huijgen and Lubberink (2005) ask it for UK firms listing in the US Jordan advances the notion that Canadian firms wish to exploit a home bias among US investors. Huijgen and Lubberink, as do Lang, Raedy and Yetman (2003b), report that UK firms listed in the US are more conservative in their earnings reports than similar firms not listed in the US.…”

Section: Corporate Governance Through Crosslisting: the Bonding Hypotmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Crosslisting on Corporate Governance: A Review of the International Evidence

Ferris¹,

Kim²,

Noronha³

2009

Corporate Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Manuscript Type: ReviewResearch Question: This review essay examines the mechanisms by which crosslisting of a firm's shares on a foreign stock exchange and its subsequent exposure to an international capital market can induce changes in corporate governance. We also review reasons why a firm might elect to use crosslisting to improve investor perception of the quality of its governance. Research Findings/Results: After a review of the existing literature, we conclude that there is substantial support for legal bonding in the decision to crosslist, with lesser evidence consistent with reputational bonding. We also conclude that firm growth opportunities and the need for external capital are critical factors in a decision to crosslist. Theoretical Implications: This study synthesizes the extensive empirical work done on crosslisting and consequent changes in corporate governance structures. It also highlights a number of areas that require further research including more direct testing of governance changes following crosslisting, the effect of crosslisting on corporate equity ownership structures, and the investment/new securities issuance behavior of firms subsequent to crosslisting. This research will help to chart the path of future academic study by scholars of international corporate governance. Practical Implications: This review of the empirical evidence will contribute to the identification of a set of best practices that can lead to improved governance for firms worldwide. Furthermore, the discussion of what remains unexamined by governance researchers will help to shape the contours of future policy and legislative debate.

show abstract

Section: Corporate Governance Through Crosslisting: the Bonding Hypotmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Crosslisting on Corporate Governance: A Review of the International Evidence

Ferris¹,

Kim²,

Noronha³

2009

Corporate Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This trend was seen as further possible evidence for the convergence of corporate governance practices towards a US model. 138 The Paulson Committee Report, however, suggests that the stringency of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and increased associated compliance costs 139 have resulted in the opposite phenomenon, whereby foreign companies are now avoiding crosslisting on US markets. 140 Whereas a central goal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was to restore investor confidence via rule-based regulation, 141 the Paulson Committee Report stresses the need to protect shareholders from excessive regulation that may impair the competitiveness of US markets.…”

Section: Scandal Reforms Did and Did Not Addressmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolving ‘Rules of the Game‘ in Corporate Governance Reform

Hill¹

2007

Private Equity, Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of Capital Market Regulation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…At that time, it was often assumed that the marked trend towards cross-listing of foreign firms in the US during the 1990s constituted a desirable form of regulatory competition,137 in which companies incorporated in jurisdictions with weak minority shareholder protection could voluntarily adopt higher standards. This trend was seen as further possible evidence for the convergence of corporate governance practices towards a US model 138. The Paulson Committee Report, however, suggests that the stringency of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and increased associated compliance costs139 have resulted in the opposite phenomenon, whereby foreign companies are now avoiding crosslisting on US markets 140.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%