The changing role of employment status in marriage formation among young Korean adults

Abstract

BACKGROUNDDespite a persistent decline in Korea's marriage rates over the past three decades, there is a striking lack of research on the transition to marriage among young Koreans. Similarly, few studies have examined how economic determinants have evolved over the past several decades, even as the Korean social and socioeconomic structure has undergone substantial transformation. METHODS This paper examines changes over time in the determinants of marriage formation inKorea, using employment history data from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) on three cohorts of young adults born in the 1950s-1970s. RESULTSResults indicate that, for women, the marital implications of being employed reversed over the three decades examined. While working decreased the odds of getting married for women born in the 1950s, it had no statistically significant effect for those born in the 1960s, and it strongly increased the odds of marriage for the most recent (1970s) cohort of women. For their part, men's employment not only continued to positively predict getting married over the three decades, but its impact became stronger with each cohort, so that a man's odds of transition to first marriage was most strongly tied to his employment status for those born in the 1970s, as compared to earlier cohorts. CONTRIBUTIONThis study contributes to the literature by addressing the relationship between marriage timing and economic resources using more direct measures, examining the association between mandatory military service and marriage formation, and testing if determinants of marriage timing may evolve over time in Korea.

Cohabitation and Marriage: Complexity and Diversity in Union‐Formation Patterns

“…Indeed, in England, studies have shown that job instability or downward career trajectories depress marriage rates among recent marriage‐age cohorts (Bukodi, ). Other labor market indicators—such as working in nonregular or fixed‐term jobs or garnering only temporary work contracts—significantly reduced the likelihood of entering marital unions across Europe and East Asia (Kim, ; Piotrowski, Kalleberg, & Rindfuss, ; Vignoli, Tocchioni, & Salvini, ). In Europe, cohabitation is less sensitive than marriage to economic insecurity and instability (Jalovaara, ; Kalmijn, ; Perelli‐Harris et al, ), owing perhaps to more generous social welfare regimes that are less tied to marital status or the presence of children (Esping‐Andersen, ).…”

“…For starters, cohabitation is much less common (Raymo et al, ). Among recent cohorts of young people in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, women's economic contributions are increasingly important predictors of marriage (Kim, ; Qian, ; Raymo et al, ). Yet East Asian countries exhibit patterns suggesting that they are still in Stage 1 of the Gender Revolution.…”

Factors related to low birth rate among married women in Korea

“…In addition, the declining birth rate is related to values and attitudes regarding marriage, lifestyle choices, parenthood, gender role attitudes, gender equity values, and so on [ 13 , 14 ]. Moreover, the recent labor market insecurity, higher unemployment of young adults, increased cost of living, nuclear family formations, gender equity issues, and inflexible gender roles in Korea are additional triggers for fertility pattern changes among Korean women [ 15 , 16 ].…”

Attitudes towards Parenthood and Fertility Awareness in Female and Male University Students in South Korea

“…The tendency to delay childbearing reflects various factors, including perceptions of the value of marriage and children, gender equity, a supportive environment, pursuing educational goals, and securing economic stability [6][7][8]. Song and colleagues reported that the birth rate was higher among women who had only graduated from high school than among college or university graduates [7].…”