The changing social relations of a community-based mangrove forest project in Zanzibar

The promise of common pool resource theory and the reality of commons projects

“…Contrasting with CPR theory's largely apolitical view, several commentators have pointed out, the set-up of commons institutions can be motivated by ambitions other than resource conservation, e.g. territorial claims (McCay 2002, 371), party political affiliation (Saunders et al 2010), indigenous/customary rights (Murombedzi 1998) or, paradoxically, more centralised government control (Rihoy and Maguranyanga 2007). Given these varied project motivations, without a shared cultural history mediating the relationship between the idea that there is a resource problem and the response of an institutional solution, there may be little to connect the decision-making norms of actors with commons projects.…”

“…A key critique of commons projects forwarded by these commentators has been a failure to deal with wider structures of injustice that impinge on project beneficiaries. Prominent factors cited are limited property rights or weak tenure (Murombedzi 1998;DeGeorges and Reilly 2009;Hatcher et al 2009); communities only granted access to low value forest resources (Agrawal and Ribot 1999, 22;Jones 2004); an inability to benefit from tourism because of poor infrastructure, structural exclusion or control by remote based tourism interests (Britton 2004;Grossman and Holden 2007;Saunders 2011); government resistance to devolving power (Murombedzi, 1997;Lind and Cappon 2001;Saunders et al 2010). A 'thick' approach focuses more on disclosing asymmetrical power relations around rights of access and situations of poverty.…”

“…Co-option should be distinguished from providing project support, although this may not be straightforward and overdependence on technical expertise may slide into the political realm of control. There is also considerable evidence that elite groups' interests may in some cases even enhance their positions through the perceived increased legitimacy of democratically structured and consensus oriented CBNRM projects (Gibbes and Keys 2010;Saunders et al 2010). At stake here is whether competition and difference can be handled within the cooperative framework of commons projects.…”

“…Commons projects invariably involve and affect a wider range of institutions than those usually addressed in interventions. To capture these influences a wider and more intensive scope needs to be cast beyond viewing actors as purely placed-based, 'rational resource users' (Saunders et al 2010).…”

Turning the Tide: How Blue Carbon and Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) Might Help Save Mangrove Forests

“…However, common strands include the frequently observed lack of sustainability of externally formulated institutional arrangements where these are unfamiliar in local contexts. Describing donor-driven interventions in mangrove forests in Zanzibar, Saunders et al (2010) note the destabilization of preexisting institutional arrangements and the creation of a new elite within the village, comprising those closely engaged with the donor project. This proved to be a driver of conflict and dissent and contributed to the ultimate failure of the project suggesting the need for practitioners to engage more closely with lessons on group formation and community resource management (e.g., Agrawal 2001) and with issues of procedural environmental justice, for practical as well as ethical reasons (Suiseeya and Caplow 2013).…”