The Characteristics of Nuclear Terrorist Weapons

Maerli, Morten Bremer; Schaper, Annette; Barnaby, Frank

doi:10.1177/0002764202239151

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…One of the major impediments to the terrorist use of a nuclear or radiological weapon is both the technical skills necessary to design a weapon and access to materials. However, designing a crude nuclear device is not necessarily considered to be difficult, and material access may in fact be the main impediment (161).…”

Section: Proliferationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy Infrastructure and Security

Farrell

Zerriffi

Dowlatabadi

2004

Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.

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Concerns about safeguarding key infrastructures (such as energy, communications, banking, and roads) from deliberate attack are long-standing, but since the end to the cold war, emphasis has turned to the possible impacts of terrorism. Activities to address these concerns are sometimes called critical infrastructure protection (CIP), a concept that is somewhat different from the one of "energy security," which focuses on politically and economically motivated supply interruptions. Different elements of the energy infrastructure are characterized by distinct vulnerabilities. Breaches of security in nuclear plants can lead to large-scale environmental disasters-but the infrastructure is concentrated and relatively easy to guard. Oil and gas production, transportation, and refining infrastructures are often spatially concentrated, and disruptions can lead to shortages if supply is not restored before stockpiles are exhausted. Traditional electricity infrastructures suffer from the need for system-wide integrity to ensure supply reliability, having critical facilities spatially concentrated (substations), and insignificant storage capacity for emergency supply. This review discusses how energy infrastructure and security are related, how this relationship differs from traditional energy security concepts, and what it may mean for private and policy decisions. Key concepts include redundancy, diversity, resilience, storage, decentralization, and interdependence. The concept of CIP is still relatively new and is likely to evolve over time, possibly away from a "guards, gates, and guns" defensive approach and toward a design approach that yields systems that are inherently harder to successfully attack. Such survivable systems may feature distributed intelligence, control, and operations.

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Section: Proliferationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy Infrastructure and Security

Farrell

Zerriffi

Dowlatabadi

2004

Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.

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“…These devices are not likely to be the size of the 5 ton Little Boy nuclear bomb utilized during World War II, rather they may be small enough to be delivered as a truck bomb or possibly even in a backpack. 28 This form of terrorism has become of increasing concern as more countries either produce or seek to produce nuclear weapons and/or civilian nuclear capabilities. Due to the dual use nature of nuclear power even civilian nuclear countries are at risk for theft of nuclear material and spent nuclear fuel 4 .…”

Section: Theft or Creation Of A Nuclear Weaponmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preparing Communities for Nuclear Terrorism

Stewart¹

2013

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“…A dirty bomb ingredient was discovered in more than 65% of these cases; whereas 16 incidents involved trafficking of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu). Some experts believe that terrorists could build a crude nuclear weapon if they can acquire a sufficient amount of HEU or plutonium (see Bunn and Wier 2006, Allison 2004, Maerli et al 2003. In addition, Rosoff and von Winterfeldt (2007) developed a model on the feasibility of a dirty bomb attack upon the twin Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach that shows if terrorists can successfully complete the planning and preparation tasks of an attack, there is a reasonable chance that they can accomplish their mission.…”

Section: Section I: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Better Nuclear Weapon Detection Capability Justified?

Bakır¹,

Winterfeldt²

2011

Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management

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In this paper, we present a decision tree model for evaluation of the next generation radiation portal technology (Advanced Spectroscopic Portals or ASPs) to scan containers entering the United States non-intrusively against nuclear or radiological weapons. Advanced Spectroscopic Portals are compared against the current designs of portal monitors (plastic scintillators or PVTs). We consider five alternative deployment strategies: 1) Exclusive deployment of ASPs replacing all the PVTs currently deployed at U.S. ports of entry, 2) Sequential deployment of ASPs with PVTs installing ASPs in all secondary and some primary inspections areas, 3) Sequential deployment of ASPs with PVTs installing ASPs in only secondary inspections areas, 4) Exclusive deployment of PVTs, 5) Stop deployment of new portal monitors and continue inspections with the current capacity. The baseline solution recommends a hybrid strategy that supports the deployment of new designs of portal monitors for secondary inspections and current designs of portal monitors for primary inspections. However, this solution is found to be very sensitive to the probability of attack attempt, the type of weapon shipped through ports of entry, the probability of successful detonation, detection probabilities and the extra deterrence that each alternative may provide. We also illustrate that the list of most significant parameters depends heavily on the dollar equivalent of overall consequences and the probability of attack attempt. For low probability and low consequence scenarios, false alarm related parameters are found to have more significance. Our extensive exploratory analysis shows that for most parametric combinations, continued deployment of portal monitors is recommended. Exclusive deployment of ASPs is optimal under high risk scenarios. However, we also show that if ASPs fail to improve detection capability, then extra benefits they offer in reducing false alarms may not justify their mass deployment.

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The Characteristics of Nuclear Terrorist Weapons

Cited by 8 publications

References 16 publications

Energy Infrastructure and Security

Energy Infrastructure and Security

Preparing Communities for Nuclear Terrorism

Is Better Nuclear Weapon Detection Capability Justified?

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