The Choice of Governing Instrument

Abstract

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Editorial Financial sector reform and policy design in an age of instability

“…This focus on instruments has animated much of the existing discourse on policy design. Indeed, much of the early work on policy design had focused extensively on how policy instruments could be categorised or typologised (Bressers & Klok, 1988;Hood, 1986;Salamon, 1981;Trebilcock & Hartle, 1982;Tupper & Doern, 1981;Woodside, 1986).…”

Assessing Instrument Mixes through Program‐ and Agency‐Level Data: Methodological Issues in Contemporary Implementation Research

“…Although it was acknowledged that, in some circumstances, governments might well choose particular instruments based on their technical efficiency and theoretical appropriateness, it was argued that this was likely to occur only in very specific circumstances when more political considerations could be held constant or at bay; such as when economists controlled the decision‐making process and had a relatively free hand in so doing—as occurred occasionally, for example, in areas such as fiscal and monetary policymaking (Markoff & Montecinos, 1993). First generation studies of policy instruments conducted by political scientists thus tended to be motivated precisely by the desire to understand what economists simply assumed: the “rationale for policy instrument choice.” Public policymakers were not generally thought to be driven by questions of theoretical purity—especially when, as is the case with economic theory, the theory is contested—but rather by a more overt political calculus (Lowi, 1966; Trebilcock & Hartle, 1982; Wilson, 1974).…”

“…T heories of policy instrument choice have gone through several “generations” (Goggin, Bowman, Lester, & O’Toole, 1990; O’Toole, 2000) as theorists have moved from the analysis of individual instruments (Salamon, 1981, 2002) to comparative studies of instrument selection (Bemelmans‐Videc, Rist, & Vedung, 1998; Howlett, 1991; Peters & Van Nispen, 1998; Varone, 2000) and the development of theories of instrument choice (Hood, 1986; Linder & Peters, 1989; Trebilcock & Hartle, 1982).…”

Conditional grants to independent foundations : the emergence and evolution of a federal policy instrument in Canada

“…In terms of a broad characterization of the instrument choice process, evidence examined for this dissertation supports a neoinstitutional rather than a rational choice approach to the choice of policy instrument, particularly the argument that instrument choice is shaped by the institutional and systemic context (Linder and Peters, 1989;Atkinson and Nigol, 1989). Evidence from the case studies contradicts the concept of decision-making by rational actors supported by a comprehensive and fully informed analysis of available policy instruments (Trebilcock et al, 1982;Doern and Wilson, 1974, etc.), suggesting instead that decision-makers choose from a limited subset of available policy instruments in alignment with the concept of bounded rationality.…”

“…Moving beyond typologies based on shared characteristics and efforts to theorize the decision making process as the outcome of rational calculations of selfinterest (Howlett, 2005, pp. 32-33), work in the field has advanced over time to recognize that ideas, interests, and institutions all play a role in influencing instrument choice decisions (Trebilcock, 2005). This more comprehensive analysis of the instrument choice process is described by Linder and Peters who argue that it is necessary to look not just at the nature and use of various policy instruments, but also at the institutional context, including the culture, values systems and external contacts of the organization in which decision-makers operate (1998, pp.…”