The choice of recycling strategies for decision-makers based on government subsidy and service budget

Shan, Renbang; Luo, Li; Shi, Baoli

doi:10.1007/s10668-021-02101-9

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 60 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…They found that subsidies and channel encroachment positively affect recycling activities, where the subsidy and channel cost levels are important factors for social welfare and corporate benefits. Shan et al [22] discussed the impact of service budgets, recovery subsidies, and different forms of recovery on decision-making. The study found that, as soon as the service budget allows, the retailer recycling model has the highest recovery efficiency and social welfare.…”

Section: Clsc Management Under Government Subsidymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are many existing pieces of literature that have used game theory to study CLSC with government subsidies. Some academics have investigated how government subsidies affect business operations [18][19][20][21][22]. Furthermore, another part of the literature studied the influence of selecting different subsidy policies and recipients [1,23,24].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Decision-Making in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Fairness Concerns and Optimal Subsidies

2023

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Government subsidies have played an important role in closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) waste utilization. However, when the retailer is disadvantaged in the supply chain cooperation and does not have access to subsidies, fairness issues may arise that affect pricing and subsidies. Therefore, this study aims to examine the optimal solutions for a government-led CLSC with remanufacturing subsidies and fairness concerns. We develop a three-echelon game with a government, a manufacturer, and a fairness-concerned retailer and derive the solutions for four scenarios: the fairness-neutral model, without fairness issues; the retailer has fairness concerns about the distribution of supply chain profits, and the concerned behavior is recognized by the manufacturer; the retailer is fairness-concerned, but the manufacturer ignores the concerned behavior; and the centralized scenario. Through the comparative analysis of different models, we design a cooperation mechanism for enterprises. Then, the conclusions are verified by numerical experiments. This study shows the following: (1) The retailer is always willing to maintain fairness concerns, but this does not affect the amount of collection. (2) The government will consume more subsidies because of the fairness issue ignored by the manufacturer. (3) Only when unit waste pollution is relatively low while the degree of fairness concerns is significant, will the manufacturer recognize the fairness concerns to reduce its unfavorable impact on profit. The increase in the level of concern can bring more benefits for two enterprises by consuming more subsidies for the highly polluting wastes. (4) A two-part tariff contract can coordinate the enterprises and promote social welfare within a certain parameter range.

show abstract

Section: Clsc Management Under Government Subsidymentioning

confidence: 99%