The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests

Hoffman, Elizabeth; Spitzer, Matthew L.

doi:10.1086/467008

Cited by 310 publications

(122 citation statements)

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“…In general, a Coase experiment must satisfy Hoffman and Spitzer's ( 1982) well-defined set of assumptions: (a) two parties to each bargain, (b) perfect knowledge of one another's utility functions, (c) perfectly competitive markets, (d) zero transactions costs, (e) costless court system, (f) profit-expected utility-maximizing consumers, (g) no wealth effects, and (h) parties will strike mutually advantageous bargains in the absence of transactions costs. Given assumptions (a) through (g), assumption (h) creates two testable behavior outcomes of Coasian bargaining: Pareto-optimal agreements between two parties and the agreements are mutually advantageous.…”

Section: Coasian Bargaining and Binary Lottery Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To the extent possible, the experimental design and procedures follow Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) and Harrison and McKee (1985). All subjects were undergraduate students at Appalachian State University, and were considered inexperienced bargainers, i.e., no subject had participated in a Coasian bargaining experiment.…”

Section: Experimental Design and Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since a certain outcome could be achieved, we monitored each individual's risk preference for the lotteries where there was an 80 Hoffman and Spitzer (1982, 1985a, 1986 Consistant with previous bargaining experiments, all contracts were perfectly enforced.…”

Section: Experimental Design and Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Beginning with Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) and Prudencio (1982), several experimental studies have argued that the Coase theorem is quite robust. 1 In general, the studies have supported the two key behavioral outcomes implied by Coasian bargaining: (i) two parties will agree on a Pareto-optimal level of an externality, and (ii) the agreement will be obtained through mutually advantageous bargaining between two parties.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Even in the private or limited information experiments of Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) the payoff streams were deterministic.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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An experiment on Coasian bargaining over ex ante lotteries and ex post rewards

Shogren¹

1992

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We examine Coasian bargaining under uncertain payoff streams. subjects bargained over both an ex ante lottery and the ex post reward. The results indicate nearly 87 percent of all agreements were Pareto efficient. However, only 7.3 percent were mutually advantageous, while nearly 85 percent of all agreements split the reward equally.Consequently, we remain cautious about policy recommendations based on the Coase theorem where uncertain payoffs exist. Finally we find no evidence supporting the proposition that a fundamental difference exists between bargaining behavior over the ex ante lottery and the ex post rewards of an uncertain event. Disciplines Behavioral EconomicsThis article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/91 Finally, we find no evidence supporting the proposition that a fundamental difference exists between bargaining behavior over the ex ante lottery and the ex post rewards of an uncertain event. An Experiment on Coasian Bargaining over Ex Ante Lotteries and Ex Post Rewards

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Section: Coasian Bargaining and Binary Lottery Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Experimental Design and Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Experimental Design and Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Even in the private or limited information experiments of Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) the payoff streams were deterministic.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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An experiment on Coasian bargaining over ex ante lotteries and ex post rewards

Shogren¹

1992

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Justice and power: when will justice concerns encourage the advantaged to support policies which redistribute economic resources and the disadvantaged to willingly obey the law?

Smith

Tyler

1996

Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.

148

102

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Two studies are presented which test whether justice can motivate support for government policies and authorities even when such support is not in people's obvious personal or group interest. In the first study, White San Francisco Bay area residents' attitudes toward Congressionally-authored affirmative action policies and anti-discrimination laws were investigated. In the second study, African-American San Francisco Bay area residents'feelings of obligation to obey the law were investigated. The results from both studies show a significant relationship between evaluations of social justice and respondents' political attitudes. More importantly, a significant relationship between relational evaluations of Congress and political attitudes is found in both studies. This relationship suggests how justice can motivate policy and government support even i f such support does not yield direct personal or group benefits. Finally, the results from both studies indicate when instrumental and relational concerns will be related to political attitudes. If people identified with their particular advantaged or disadvantaged group, instrumental concerns were more strongly related to their political attitudes, but if people identi3ed with a superordinate category that included both potential outgroup members and relevant superordinate authorities, relational concerns were more strongly related to their political attitudes.

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References

2004

Conflict and Cooperation

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The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests

Abstract: 'UCRL-3773 Some experimental consequences of the Luders theorem are discussed.

Cited by 310 publications

References 1 publication

An experiment on Coasian bargaining over ex ante lotteries and ex post rewards

An experiment on Coasian bargaining over ex ante lotteries and ex post rewards

Justice and power: when will justice concerns encourage the advantaged to support policies which redistribute economic resources and the disadvantaged to willingly obey the law?

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