The coevolution mechanism of stakeholder strategies in the recycled resources industry innovation ecosystem: the view of evolutionary game theory

Xinyu, Hao; Liu, Guangfu; Dong, Liang

doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2022.121627

Cited by 38 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 67 publications

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“…Generally, the spatial distribution of this comprehensive level of green innovation is heterogeneous, with cities with high levels of green innovation generating spillover and suction effects, thereby promoting the migration or gathering of surrounding green innovation subjects and elements. Using administrative boundaries, a strict hierarchical nested structure is formed in the geographical space (Hao et al, 2022; Zeng et al, 2022). With the continuous enhancement of industrial intelligence and digitization, high‐end green innovation production factors based on data storage have significantly diminished the barrier effect of spatial distance and administrative boundaries (Pushpananthan & Elmquist, 2022; Zhao et al, 2023).…”

Section: Theory and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the diffusion of green innovation behavior based on complex network evolutionary game

Chen,

Yang,

Zhang

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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The strategic choice of green innovation subjects and the evolution of green innovation networks have a two‐way feedback effect. This study aims to construct a comprehensive framework for analyzing the evolution of green innovation networks from micro to macro levels. The gravity model demonstrates the structural complexity of green innovation networks. Additionally, an evolutionary game model based on green innovation networks is constructed to discuss the network's diffusion mechanism of green innovation behavior and its influence on network characteristic indicators. The research findings reveal that (1) the green innovation networks in China exhibit a continuous growth trend but the connectivity of urban nodes varies significantly; (2) the green innovation network's marginal nodes are the “vulnerable groups” in the evolutionary game and the active green innovation strategy cannot be completely spread; and (3) the cost of passive green innovation and the demand for green consumption are the internal and external driving forces that promote the spread of the active green innovation strategy in the network. Finally, this study concludes with several suggestions, including the establishment of a mechanism to promote green innovation reform with the city, industry, and enterprises as the node, fulcrum, and focus, respectively. Additionally, it suggests increasing domestic demand for green consumption. These findings and suggestions can provide a reference for the development of green innovation in other countries or regions.

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Section: Theory and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the diffusion of green innovation behavior based on complex network evolutionary game

Chen,

Yang,

Zhang

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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“…In a related study, game theory models can be employed to analyze the government's decisions regarding eco-innovation behavior (Bimonte et al, 2022;Fu et al, 2023;Sun et al, 2023). Adopting an evolutionary game theory perspective, we can further investigate the coevolution of stakeholder strategies within a system, explore evolutionary trajectories and system stability conditions through numerical simulations, and analyze the policy implications of government behavior (Dong et al, 2022;Hao et al, 2022;Li, 2022;Li et al, 2023;Wu et al, 2020;Zhang & Kong, 2022).…”

Section: Evolutionary Game Theoretical Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Following the research findings of Lyapunov, if all eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix are non-positive at the equilibrium point, that point is considered an ESS for the system (Hao et al, 2022;Li et al, 2023;Lyapunov, 1992;Ritzberger & Weibull, 1995). ESS points under information asymmetry must be pure strategy Nash equilibrium points (Friedman, 1991;Selten & Selten, 1988).…”

Section: Model Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to promote the digital business model innovation of high‐tech SMEs through government venture capital? An evolutionary game perspective

Yin,

Liu,

Zeng

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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Digital business model innovation plays a crucial role in the growth of high‐tech small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs). In this research, we introduced tripartite evolutionary game models that include the government, venture capital (VC) institutions, and high‐tech SMEs, operating within the context of government venture capital. Within the scenarios of government revenue and loss compensation, we assess the evolutionary stable strategies of each stakeholder and analyze variations in the evolution results. Using numerical simulation, we investigate how factors impact players' strategic choices and the evolution of the system. The findings indicate the presence of an indirect transmission mechanism among players' strategic choices, which collaboratively stabilizes the game system. Furthermore, we investigate the policy consequences of various compensation mechanisms and find that high‐tech SMEs' strategic choices are not influenced by these compensation approaches. However, the incentive effects of different compensation on the government and VCs' investment strategies vary. Revenue compensation is more favorable for VC institutions but places a greater financial burden on the government. In contrast, loss compensation is a more efficient approach for the government. This study offers valuable insights for the management and operation of government venture capital funds, and the advancement of digital business model innovation for high‐tech SMEs.

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“…Set the dynamic equations of Enterprise 1, Enterprise 2, and the government to be zero; eight partial equilibrium solutions can be obtained [ 74 ], namely

, and

. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix obtained from the equilibrium points are shown in Table 7 .…”

Section: Construction and Analysis Of Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

Chen

Liu

2022

IJERPH

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As one of the most efficient means of emission reduction policies, carbon quota trading has a far-reaching impact on the carbon emission reduction of enterprises. Firstly, a two-party evolutionary game model of enterprise and government and a three-party evolutionary game model of enterprise–enterprise–government are constructed based on the multi-agent driving mechanism, evolutionary game theory, scenario simulation, and other methods. Then, we conduct a series of policy simulations for carbon emission under different scenario models and various enforcement strengths. Lastly, the behavioral strategies and system evolution trajectories in enterprises and government carbon trading are comprehensively investigated. The results show that in the two-party and three-party evolutionary game models, the carbon trading behavior is affected by the joint action of the enterprise and the government. The difference in initial willingness mainly affects the speed of the subject’s convergence to the steady state. Based on this, policy suggestions are proposed, such as reducing the cost of carbon emission of enterprises, enhancing the vitality of carbon emission reduction of enterprises, and stimulating the power of government regulation and responsibility performance, which can provide suggestions for the development of the carbon market.

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The coevolution mechanism of stakeholder strategies in the recycled resources industry innovation ecosystem: the view of evolutionary game theory

Cited by 38 publications

References 67 publications

Research on the diffusion of green innovation behavior based on complex network evolutionary game

Research on the diffusion of green innovation behavior based on complex network evolutionary game

How to promote the digital business model innovation of high‐tech SMEs through government venture capital? An evolutionary game perspective

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

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