The cognitive impenetrability of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for purely nonconceptual content

Raftopoulos, Athanassios

doi:10.1080/09515089.2012.729486

Cited by 39 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Indeed, it has been argued that the first 100 ms of visual processing are cognitively impenetrable (Raftopoulos, 2009, 2014), and there is certainly scarcer evidence to support penetration of this very early processing stage. However some investigations have highlighted that the C1 component (originating in V1, with onset around 50 ms post-stimulus and peak latencies before 100 ms) is penetrable by top-down influence (Rauss, Schwartz, & Pourtois, 2011).…”

Section: The Timescale Of Top-down Penetration In Visionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Predictive coding is both a biologically and computationally plausible description of information flow in the brain, yet the intimately related process of cognitive penetration in perception is hotly debated (Firestone & Scholl, 2015, in press; Macpherson, 2012; O’Callaghan, Kveraga, Shine, Adams, & Bar, in press; Raftopoulos, 2014; Stokes, 2013; Vetter & Newen, 2014; Zadra & Clore, 2011). Cognitive penetration entails that a myriad of information from other modalities can influence the earlier stages of the perceptual process.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Predictions penetrate perception: Converging insights from brain, behaviour and disorder

O’Callaghan

Kveraga

Shine

et al. 2017

Consciousness and Cognition

146

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It is argued that during ongoing visual perception, the brain is generating top-down predictions to facilitate, guide and constrain the processing of incoming sensory input. Here we demonstrate that these predictions are drawn from a diverse range of cognitive processes, in order to generate the richest and most informative prediction signals. This is consistent with a central role for cognitive penetrability in visual perception. We review behavioural and mechanistic evidence that indicate a wide spectrum of domains—including object recognition, contextual associations, cognitive biases and affective state—that can directly influence visual perception. We combine these insights from the healthy brain with novel observations from neuropsychiatric disorders involving visual hallucinations, which highlight the consequences of imbalance between top-down signals and incoming sensory information. Together, these lines of evidence converge to indicate that predictive penetration, be it cognitive, social or emotional, should be considered a fundamental framework that supports visual perception.

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Section: The Timescale Of Top-down Penetration In Visionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Predictions penetrate perception: Converging insights from brain, behaviour and disorder

O’Callaghan

Kveraga

Shine

et al. 2017

Consciousness and Cognition

146

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We are now in a position to revisit the claim the idea that because perception is in the business of truth, of evaluating what is "really out there", it should be encapsulated lest we perceive merely what we think is there rather than what is really there (e.g., Fodor, 1983;Orlandi, 2014;Pylyshyn, 1999;Raftopoulos, 2014;Siegel, 2012;Stokes, 2011). I will argue that this entailment is false.…”

Section: The Role Of Knowledge In Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Reliable is Perception?

Lupyan¹

2017

Philosophical Topics

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People believe that perception is reliable and that what they perceive reflects objective reality. On this view, we perceive a red circle because there is something out there that is a red circle. It is also commonly believed that perceptual reliability is threatened if what we see is allowed to be influenced by what we know or expect. I argue that although human perception is often (but not always) highly consistent and stable, it is difficult to evaluate its reliability because when it comes to perception, it is unclear how one could establish a fact of the matter. An alternative to thinking of perception as being in the business of truth, is thinking of it as being in the business of transducing sensory energy into a form useful for guiding adaptive behavior. On this position, perception ought to be (and, as I argue, is) richly influenced by some types of knowledge insofar as this knowledge can aid in the construction of useful representations from sensory input.

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“…Keywords: Cognitive Penetration; Constitutive Conditions on Nonconceptual Content; Nonconceptual Content 1. Introduction Toribio (2014) argues against the thesis (Raftopoulos, 2014) that the cognitive penetrability (CP) of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for it to be nonconceptual content (NCC)-the MET (mutually entailing thesis). Her main point is that MET presupposes a non-standard, causal interpretation of NCC that either trivializes NCC or fails to engage with the literature on NCC, in which "the property of being nonconceptual is not construed in empirical but in constitutive terms" (Toribio, 2014).…”

Section: Athanassios Raftopoulosmentioning

confidence: 98%

The cognitive impenetrability of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for purely nonconceptual content

Cited by 39 publications

References 29 publications

Predictions penetrate perception: Converging insights from brain, behaviour and disorder

Predictions penetrate perception: Converging insights from brain, behaviour and disorder

How Reliable is Perception?

Nonconceptual content: A reply to Toribio's “Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision”

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