The Cognitive Implications of Intentional Communication: A Multifaceted Mirror

Abstract

There is a central concern in contemporary cognitive science with the validity of the use of epistemic and intentional terms to interpret the communication patterns of non-human animals. Here I argue (a) that the human developmental transition to intentional communication is a well-described phenomenon, from an empirical standpoint, (b) that the behavioural patterns that characterize intentional communication in our own species are also well-described in the communication of our nearest living relatives, the great apes, (c) that the presence of the behavioural markers for intentional communication in non-human primates does not unambiguously implicate any particular one of a large number of often mutually contradictory hypothetical psychological process models, and (d) that intentional communication by young humans is also consistent with hypothetical process models that are, themselves, mutually contradictory. Intentional communication is a class of behaviour that is open to public, objective measurement. In contrast, the hypothetical cognitive processes supporting intentional communication in both human and non-human animals are not specified by the fact that intentional communication has occurred-they could not be, except when there is an unambiguous behavioural index of invisible psychological processes, which is a contradiction in terms. In this chapter, I will examine a number of contemporary scientific practices that purportedly reveal aspects of psychological processes underlying intentional communication, and demonstrate the deficiencies of these protocols. In general, these methodological infelicities support a systematic, discipline-wide double standard of interpretation of the communication of animals and humans. I will conclude that there is no convincing evidence extant of different psychological processes in the intentional communication of apes and preverbal humans.

Ontogeny vs. phylogeny in primate/canid comparisons: A meta-analysis of the object choice task

“…The ability to use others' deictic cues is a developmental milestone in our species (Butterworth, 2001), and it is clear that human children display this ability to use communicative cues only after many months of intensive exposure to cultural environments characterized by frequent referential signalling, both verbally and nonverbally. There is no reason, in principle, that human children could not learn to use these communicative cues in these reference-intensive environments, notwithstanding that many contemporary researchers have elected to interpret this developmental milestone as evidence for human-unique cognitive abilities (for discussion, see, e.g., Leavens, 2018;Moore & Corkum, 1994;Triesch, Teuscher, Deák, & Carlson, 2006). Thus, a promising corrective approach is to intensively train animals to use referential cues; if representatives of a species are incapable of learning to use these cues even after months of intensive training to use the cue, then one might reasonably conclude that the species has an inherent difficulty understanding these cues.…”

The Referential Problem Space revisited: An ecological hypothesis of the evolutionary and developmental origins of pointing

“…The relevant entailments of the telementational model of psychological functioning to the present argument are that human babies are held to be able to discern and to attempt to manipulate the minds or mental contents of others. It is my contention that this interpretation of the communication of children cannot be empirically verified, and therefore is of little to no scientific utility (Leavens, 2018;Leavens et al, 2008Leavens et al, , 2019.…”

“…This classic dual-process model posits an operant process for the acquisition of imperative pointing and, depending on the source, either (a) a human species-unique cognitive adaptation for representing the contents of other minds (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1989Povinelli et al, 2003; or (b) a human species-specific motivational adaptation for collaborative engagement (e.g., for the acquisition of declarative pointing. Irrespective of whether it is a cognitive capacity or a motivation that is claimed to be species-specific to humans, this theoretical perspective lacks any direct empirical support and is, moreover, unfalsifiable, in principle (see reviews by Leavens, 2011Leavens, , 2018Leavens et al, 2019).…”

Why study turn‐taking sequences in interspecies interactions?

“…But if they are homologous, this assumes that there is an evolutionary continuity between rudimentary forms of alternation and more complex turn‐taking sequences and rule‐governed conversational exchanges in humans. The idea that “great apes provide a window back in time on our last prelinguistic ancestor’s communication and cognition” (Lameira & Call, 2020) has been critically examined in several studies (Laland & Brown, 2011; Lameira & Call, 2020; Leavens et al., 2017; Leavens, 2018). Moreover, the turn‐taking capacities of birds such as ravens, parrots and starlings challenge the argument of phylogenetic proximity and allow for an additional hypothesis of ‘functional convergence’ (Henry et al., 2015).…”