The Coherence Theory of Knowledge

Lehrer, Keith

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248507.003.0011

Cited by 60 publications

(62 citation statements)

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“…Various authors identify this missing ingredient as "robustness" (Hintikka [34]), "indefeasibility" (Klein [37], Lehrer [39], Lehrer and Paxson [40], Stalnaker [51]) or "stability" (Rott [45]). According to this defeasibility theory of knowledge (or "stability theory", as formulated by Rott), a belief counts as "knowledge" if it is stable under belief revision with any new evidence: "if a person has knowledge, than that person's justification must be sufficiently strong that it is not capable of being defeated by evidence that he does not possess" (Pappas and Swain [42]).…”

Section: Safe Belief and The Defeasibility Theory Of Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

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A Qualitative Theory of Dynamic Interactive Belief Revision

Baltag

Smets

2016

Readings in Formal Epistemology

177

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We present a logical setting that incorporates a belief-revision mechanism within Dynamic-Epistemic logic. As the "static" basis for belief revision, we use epistemic plausibility models, together with a modal language based on two epistemic operators: a "knowledge" modality K (the standard S5, fully introspective, notion), and a "safe belief" modality 2 ("weak", non-negatively-introspective, notion, capturing a version of Lehrer's "indefeasible knowledge"). To deal with "dynamic" belief revision, we introduce action plausibility models, representing various types of "doxastic events". Action models "act" on state models via a modified update product operation: the "ActionPriority" Update. This is the natural dynamic generalization of AGM revision, giving priority to the incoming information (i.e. to "actions") over prior beliefs. We completely axiomatize this logic, and show how our update mechanism can "simulate", in a uniform manner, many different belief-revision policies.

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Section: Safe Belief and The Defeasibility Theory Of Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The most important such notion expresses a form of "weak (non-introspective) knowledge" 2 a P , first introduced by Stalnaker in his modal formalization [49,51] of Lehrer's defeasibility analysis of knowledge [39,40]. We call this notion safe belief, to distinguish it from our (Aumann-type) concept of knowledge.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Qualitative Theory of Dynamic Interactive Belief Revision

Baltag

Smets

2016

Readings in Formal Epistemology

177

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“…Indeed, whether there is some such standing might seem to depend upon what we think about the cases of clairvoyants and other epistemically naïve subjects (e.g. BonJour 1980, Foley 1987, Lehrer 1990 as we´ll see.…”

Section: Internalism/externalism Debatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility

Brasi

2017

Manuscrito

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In contemporary epistemology, there are a number of particular internalism/externalism debates. My concern here is with the internalism/externalism controversy about some specific positive epistemic status required for knowledge which is normally understood in terms of epistemic responsibility. I argue that, given our pervasive epistemic interdependence, such particular debate needs to be reformulated in anti-individualistic terms if it is to be an interesting one. --

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“…Versiones actuales y elaboradas del coherentismo se encuentran en Laurence Bonjour, Donald Davidson, Keith Lehrer, y Nicholas Rescher. Véase Bonjour (1985), Davidson (1986), Lehrer (1986), y Rescher (1973. En Bonjour y Sosa (2003) se intenta ofrece un contraste ilustrativo de las diferencias entre una epistemología coherentista y una epistemología basada en la virtud.…”

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Virtudes epidémicas reflexivas. El conocimiento como una cuestión de confianza

Liz

2017

A.RIF

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reflectiVe epiStemic VirtueS. Knowledge aS a matter of truSt Manuel Liz rEsuMEnDe acuerdo a Ernest Sosa, el conocimiento reflexivo debería ser capaz de integrar algunas circularidades epistémicas como fuentes virtuosas de conocimiento. Argumentaremos que tal conocimiento reflexivo tiene que estar basado en ciertas capacidades para delegar y aplazar de manera adecuada la justificación de nuestras creencias de primer orden. También argumentaremos que entender esas capacidades comunitarias y temporales como constituyendo virtudes epistémicas reflexivas nos conduce fuera de cualquier concepción criterial del conocimiento. Para estas concepciones, conocer siempre requiere saber que se han satisfecho determinados criterios. Si el conocimiento propiamente humano inevitablemente necesita alguna dosis de reflexión, y si nuestro conocimiento reflexivo necesariamente depende del ejercicio virtuoso de ciertas capacidades para delegar y aplazar la justificación, entonces en último término el conocimiento no puede ser criterial. El conocimiento humano es más bien una cuestión de confianza PaLaBras CLavE: Conocimiento; criterios; perspectiva epistémica; circularidad epistémica; conocimiento animal; conocimiento reflexivo; ascenso epistémico; virtudes epistémicas reflexivas; delegación de la justificación; aplazamiento de la justificación. aBstraCtAccording to Ernest Sosa, reflective knowledge would have to be able to integrate some epistemic circularities as virtuous sources of knowledge. We will argue that such reflective knowledge has to be based on some capacities for delegating and relegating in adequate ways the justification of our first-order beliefs. Also, we will argue that 1 Este trabajo se han llevado a cabo en el contexto del Proyecto de Investigación, FFI2014-57409, financiado por el Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad del Gobierno de España.

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The Coherence Theory of Knowledge

Cited by 60 publications

References 0 publications

A Qualitative Theory of Dynamic Interactive Belief Revision

A Qualitative Theory of Dynamic Interactive Belief Revision

Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility

Virtudes epidémicas reflexivas. El conocimiento como una cuestión de confianza

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