“…209 In this regard, Kleffner warns that the lack of a legal framework of responsibility of armed groups is unsatisfactory for a legal system that should be governed by the rule of law. 210 Likewise, Bellal points to the lack of clear rules that 'will contribute to the difficulty of establishing and efficient and legitimate system of accountability for non-state actors'. 211 Moreover, it is still uncertain which type of responsibility framework should be applied for armed groups as collective entities.…”
Section: Academic Discussion On the Disconnection Between Primary And Secondary Rulesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…209 During 2016, the FARC-EP further recognised its responsibility for the practice of kidnapping, the 1994 massacre in La Chinita (Apartadó), the death in captivity in 2009 of 11 legislators in the Valle del Cauca, and the assassination of an Afro-Colombian human rights defender in 2015. 210 However, the High Commissioner emphasised that 'challenges remain within the State and FARC-EP concerning the full recognition of their responsibilities for past international human rights and humanitarian law violations, in a manner that satisfies the rights of victims'. 211 He also expressively called on the State and the FARC-EP 'to recognize fully their responsibility for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, in order to generate effective reparations processes based on consensus with victims; and also, to ensure non-repetition of the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that have characterized the armed conflict'.…”
Section: Examples From the Practice Of Armed Groupsmentioning
vi 2.4.A responsibility regime for armed groups under international law: an assessment 2.4.1. The responsibility gap and the rule of law 2.4.2. Prevention of impunity and the right to reparation of victims of armed conflict 2.4.3. The insufficiency of individual criminal responsibility 2. 4.4. Complementarity between individual criminal responsibility and state/collective responsibility 2.4.5. Challenges of a responsibility regime for armed groups 2.4.6. Concluding remarks on the assessment of a responsibility regime for armed groups 2.5. Conclusions CHAPTER 3 DEVELOPING A RESPONSIBILITY REGIME FOR ARMED GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3.1. vii responsibility of armed groups: a proposal 3.6. Conclusions CHAPTER 4 THE ATTRIBUTION OF CONDUCT TO ARMED GROUPS 4.1. 93 4.2.3. Towards the identification of core principles of attribution for collective entities 95 4.3. Adjusting the core principles of attribution to the conduct of armed groups 96 4.3.1. The issue of structural disparity of armed groups 97 4.3.1.1. Military and political wing 97 4.3.1.2. Centralised and decentralised groups 98 4.3.1.3. Changes of structure over the course of time 4.3.2. Concluding remarks on the adjustment of principles of attribution to armed groups 4.4. Application of rules of attribution to armed groups 4.4.1. Conduct of organs and/or agents of the armed group 4.4.1.1. The notion of organs and agents of armed groups 4.4.1.2. Is the notion of membership of armed groups relevant? 4.4.1.3. Concluding remarks: Agency based on a functional approach 4.4.2. Conduct directed and controlled by an armed group 4.4.2.1. Conduct of individuals 4.4.2.2. Conduct of factions and other entities associated with armed groups 4.4.2.3. Concluding remarks: Agency based on direction and control 4.4.3. Acknowledgment of the conduct by the armed group 4.4.3.1. Examples from the practice of armed groups 4.4.3.2. Conditions for its validity 4.4.3.3. Key implications for the process of attribution of conduct 4.5. Conclusions CHAPTER 5 THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE REPARATIONS BY ARMED GROUPS 5.1. viii 5.3.1. International humanitarian law 5.3.1.1. UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of International Human Rights Law and serious violations of International Humanitarian Law 5.3.1.2. The ILA Committee on the issue of Reparations for Victims of Armed Conflict 5.3.1.3. The Nairobi declaration on Women's and Girls' Right to a Remedy and Reparation 5.3.1.4. UN Commissions of Inquiry and other monitoring mechanisms 5.3.1.5. 2018 Report on Armed Non-State Actors by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary killings 5.3.2. International human rights law 5.3.3. International criminal law 5.3.4. Reparations at the domestic level 5.3.5. Concluding remarks on the framework of reparations for violations committed in armed conflict 5.4.The practice of armed groups regarding reparations 5.4.1. Peace agreements between armed groups and states 5.4.2. Unilateral declarations by armed groups 5.4.3. ...
“…209 In this regard, Kleffner warns that the lack of a legal framework of responsibility of armed groups is unsatisfactory for a legal system that should be governed by the rule of law. 210 Likewise, Bellal points to the lack of clear rules that 'will contribute to the difficulty of establishing and efficient and legitimate system of accountability for non-state actors'. 211 Moreover, it is still uncertain which type of responsibility framework should be applied for armed groups as collective entities.…”
Section: Academic Discussion On the Disconnection Between Primary And Secondary Rulesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…209 During 2016, the FARC-EP further recognised its responsibility for the practice of kidnapping, the 1994 massacre in La Chinita (Apartadó), the death in captivity in 2009 of 11 legislators in the Valle del Cauca, and the assassination of an Afro-Colombian human rights defender in 2015. 210 However, the High Commissioner emphasised that 'challenges remain within the State and FARC-EP concerning the full recognition of their responsibilities for past international human rights and humanitarian law violations, in a manner that satisfies the rights of victims'. 211 He also expressively called on the State and the FARC-EP 'to recognize fully their responsibility for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, in order to generate effective reparations processes based on consensus with victims; and also, to ensure non-repetition of the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that have characterized the armed conflict'.…”
Section: Examples From the Practice Of Armed Groupsmentioning
vi 2.4.A responsibility regime for armed groups under international law: an assessment 2.4.1. The responsibility gap and the rule of law 2.4.2. Prevention of impunity and the right to reparation of victims of armed conflict 2.4.3. The insufficiency of individual criminal responsibility 2. 4.4. Complementarity between individual criminal responsibility and state/collective responsibility 2.4.5. Challenges of a responsibility regime for armed groups 2.4.6. Concluding remarks on the assessment of a responsibility regime for armed groups 2.5. Conclusions CHAPTER 3 DEVELOPING A RESPONSIBILITY REGIME FOR ARMED GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3.1. vii responsibility of armed groups: a proposal 3.6. Conclusions CHAPTER 4 THE ATTRIBUTION OF CONDUCT TO ARMED GROUPS 4.1. 93 4.2.3. Towards the identification of core principles of attribution for collective entities 95 4.3. Adjusting the core principles of attribution to the conduct of armed groups 96 4.3.1. The issue of structural disparity of armed groups 97 4.3.1.1. Military and political wing 97 4.3.1.2. Centralised and decentralised groups 98 4.3.1.3. Changes of structure over the course of time 4.3.2. Concluding remarks on the adjustment of principles of attribution to armed groups 4.4. Application of rules of attribution to armed groups 4.4.1. Conduct of organs and/or agents of the armed group 4.4.1.1. The notion of organs and agents of armed groups 4.4.1.2. Is the notion of membership of armed groups relevant? 4.4.1.3. Concluding remarks: Agency based on a functional approach 4.4.2. Conduct directed and controlled by an armed group 4.4.2.1. Conduct of individuals 4.4.2.2. Conduct of factions and other entities associated with armed groups 4.4.2.3. Concluding remarks: Agency based on direction and control 4.4.3. Acknowledgment of the conduct by the armed group 4.4.3.1. Examples from the practice of armed groups 4.4.3.2. Conditions for its validity 4.4.3.3. Key implications for the process of attribution of conduct 4.5. Conclusions CHAPTER 5 THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE REPARATIONS BY ARMED GROUPS 5.1. viii 5.3.1. International humanitarian law 5.3.1.1. UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of International Human Rights Law and serious violations of International Humanitarian Law 5.3.1.2. The ILA Committee on the issue of Reparations for Victims of Armed Conflict 5.3.1.3. The Nairobi declaration on Women's and Girls' Right to a Remedy and Reparation 5.3.1.4. UN Commissions of Inquiry and other monitoring mechanisms 5.3.1.5. 2018 Report on Armed Non-State Actors by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary killings 5.3.2. International human rights law 5.3.3. International criminal law 5.3.4. Reparations at the domestic level 5.3.5. Concluding remarks on the framework of reparations for violations committed in armed conflict 5.4.The practice of armed groups regarding reparations 5.4.1. Peace agreements between armed groups and states 5.4.2. Unilateral declarations by armed groups 5.4.3. ...
“…(Mouvement de Libération du Congo) in Congo, and more. 275 Pursuantly, Heffes and Frenkel, 276 Bílkova, 277 Mastorodimos, 278 Kleffner, 279 and also Alvarez 280 support the ability to 2021] THE ISLAMIC STATE OF HORROR 445 attribute responsibility to well-organized non-State armed groups for actions committed by their members.…”
Section: ] the Islamic State Of Horror 443mentioning
“…Aside from arguing for the responsibility of armed groups and identifying increased support for such a development, this latter group of scholars generally concludes that existing practice is too scarce to draw any definite conclusion on the matter. 21 At best, the wrongful conduct of non-State armed groups has been dealt with through monitoring and sanctioning efforts by, for instance, the UN Security Council, commissions of inquiry and other fact-finding missions, while justice efforts have predominantly focused on holding individuals criminally responsible for the crimes committed on the occasion of their membership to such groups. 22 From a reparative justice perspective, these initiatives remain unsatisfactory, since they do not provide an avenue for victims to claim reparations directly from responsible armed groups for the entire spectrum of violations and harms caused.…”
Section: Non-state Armed Groups and Reparations Under International Humanitarian Lawmentioning
This article examines whether and how non-State armed groups, as distinct entities, might be required to provide reparations for their violations of international humanitarian law. It shows that the possibility of holding armed groups to reparations is marked by uncertainty in international law. This complex question calls for clarification. In building on these observations, the article explores how the duty to provide reparations by armed groups could be operationalized as a matter of lex ferenda. This exercise involves examining how such a duty could be conceptualized and put into practice. From this discussion, a multi-faceted proposal emerges, which draws upon existing approaches in international law and responds to the particular challenges presented by armed groups. The article ends by considering the implications of the proposal.
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