2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.003
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The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game

Abstract: for comments and suggestions. I also thank for useful discussions seminar participants at the Université de Montpellier, Université de Toulouse, Université de Montréal, UQAM (Montréal), Université Laval (Québec), Canadian Economic Association (Montréal) and ESEM 2006 (Vienna). Finally, I should also like to thank two anonymous referees and an anonymous associate editor for their comments and suggestions. This paper has been greatly improved by them.The usual disclaimer applies. 1Abstract: This paper analyzes t… Show more

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Cited by 21 publications
(17 citation statements)
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“…Numerous studies of collusion in repeated contests follow a similar approach; see, for example,Linster (1994),Amegashie (2006aAmegashie ( , 2011,Shaffer and Shogren (2008), andCheikbossian (2012). Therefore, we adopt this approach so that our results on incentives for collusion are comparable to ones already existing in the literature.…”
mentioning
confidence: 84%
“…Numerous studies of collusion in repeated contests follow a similar approach; see, for example,Linster (1994),Amegashie (2006aAmegashie ( , 2011,Shaffer and Shogren (2008), andCheikbossian (2012). Therefore, we adopt this approach so that our results on incentives for collusion are comparable to ones already existing in the literature.…”
mentioning
confidence: 84%
“…6 Numerous studies of collusion in repeated contests follow a similar approach; see, for example, Linster (1994), Amegashie (2006aAmegashie ( , 2011, Shaffer andShogren (2008), andCheikbossian (2012). Therefore, we adopt this approach so that our results on incentives for collusion are comparable to ones already existing in the literature.…”
mentioning
confidence: 89%
“…In an infinitely repeated game of investment with imperfect property rights, Amegashie (2011) shows that an equilibrium with overinvestment exists where the asset owner and the potential appropriator cooperate by not competing for the asset in a subsequent contest as long as the asset owner makes a transfer increasing in investment. Cheikbossian (2012) studies infinitely repeated contests between two groups of unequal size and shows that collusion (in the sense of a group overcoming its free-rider problem and increasing its expenditures) can be as easy to sustain in the larger group as it is in the smaller group.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…11 See also Leininger and Yang (1994), who analyze a dynamic version of the classic Tullock (1980) model, Pecorino (1998), and Polborn (2006. Cheikbossian (2012) actually shows that cooperation can increase rent-seeking expenditures by resolving a collective action problem.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%