The Collective Model of Household Consumption: A Nonparametric Characterization

Collective consumption models with restricted bargaining weights: an empirical assessment based on experimental data

“…This extends earlier work of Cherchye et al (2007, who developed revealed preference conditions for the collective consumption model that do not include such assumptions. As such, these conditions allow for a huge variation of the bargaining weights across periods.…”

“…U m does not depend on q l ; l 6 ¼ m) or (ii) public consumption within the group. Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Ekeland (2006, 2009) introduced a general collective consumption model that does account for publicly consumed quantities and privately consumed quantities associated with externalities; Cherchye et al (2007 developed the revealed preference condition for this general model. We see more refined experiments that specifically focus on consumption externalities and publicly consumed quantities as an interesting avenue for future research.…”

The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior

“…Demuynck (forthcoming) establishes similar np-completeness results for the sequential choice model of Manzini and Mariotti (2007) and the model of choice by game trees from Xu and Zhou (2007). Finally, Talla Nobibon and Spieksma (2010) nd that verifying the revealed preference conditions of Pareto optimal choice behavior for a two person coalition as derived by Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2007) is an np-complete problem. is setting differs from ours in the sense that these conditions are obtained from a revealed preference analysis a là Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) (i.e.…”

“…Further, we show that the inclusion of a dominance can lead to non-trivial restrictions on observed choice behavior. 4 Next, we demonstrate that the inclusion 2 However, there has been a growing stream of research that looks at the testable implications of (weak) Pareto rationalizability in a household consumption setting with private and public goods (see, for example, Apps and Rees (1988) ;Chiappori (1988Chiappori ( , 1992 and Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2007). 3 In fact, this result and its proof is very similar to the result of Sprumont (2000, Proposition 1) who showed that weak Pareto rationalizability has no testable implications in the setting of a normal form game.…”

Transitive preferences in multi-member households

“…2 Moreover, following [14], the validity of transitive preferences has been put in question in the literature on behavioral economics. 3 Importantly, the result of [10] implies that such considerations cannot be meaningfully investigated in a setting with not more than two goods.…”