The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic Dispersion, and the Post-Soviet “Revolutions”

Radnitz, Scott

doi:10.5129/001041510x12911363509396

Cited by 40 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…36 In open-ended comments during the interviews, many of those who had given this explanation a low value on the questionnaire provided evidence which suggested that identity 34 On business elites as vital actors in opposition politics, see Radnitz (2010). 35 On the relationship between business and politics in Kyrgyzstan, and the role of the parliament as a form of bazaar, see Spector (2008).…”

Section: Identity Politicsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…It could be argued that certain post-communist countries, like Ukraine and Georgia, have not yet moved beyond "great parties," which in their cases contest fundamental issues of identity relating to East and West. 4 For works that illustrate what happens when incumbents lack such unequal economic advantages, see McMann (2006), and Radnitz (2010). For an analysis of the role of resource advantages in sustaining dominant parties in more democratic settings, see Greene (2007).…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

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The Barriers to Intra-Opposition Cooperation in the Post-Communist World: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan

Huskey

Iskakova

2010

Post-Soviet Affairs

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What explains the failure of the opposition in many post-communist states to emerge as a legitimate and enduring force in politics? Based on saturation interviewing of Kyrgyzstan's elite and the literature on Krygyzstani politics, this article examines opposition attitudes and beliefs. Opposition elites' ideas about relations between government and opposition and within the opposition itself are detailed and analyzed to understand how political actors view incentives and constraints created by their individual resources and the political and economic environment. In this case study, several assumptions of the comparative literature on oppositions in authoritarian and hybrid regimes are tested in analyzing the forms, logic, and limits of opposition in post-communist states.

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Section: Identity Politicsmentioning

confidence: 97%

mentioning

confidence: 98%

The Barriers to Intra-Opposition Cooperation in the Post-Communist World: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan

Huskey

Iskakova

2010

Post-Soviet Affairs

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“…At the same time, the government has worked to ensure that there is an absence of major new opposition movements. Across the post-Soviet region, one of the strongest sources of new opposition has been government insiders who defect to form their own opposition parties (Karatnycky 2006;Junisbai 2010;Radnitz 2010). But, as discussed above, the concentration of Azerbaijan's economic resources in the ruling elite -especially in the context of high corruption and extensive resource rents -provides an incentive for elites to remain loyal to the government.…”

Section: Prospects For Regime Stability In Azerbaijanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan

LaPorte

2014

Post-Soviet Affairs

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This paper examines the consolidation and maintenance of hegemonic authoritarianism in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Hegemonic regimes are characterized by their nearly total lack of political competition. Despite the presence of opposition parties and regular elections, the incumbent in these cases is reelected with 70% or more of the vote. What does it take to sustain overwhelming margins of victory in regular elections in the face of institutionalized opposition? Previous studies have suggested that either violent repression or institutionalized co-optation of opposition groups is central to securing long-term hegemonic regime stability. These mechanisms explain how rulers forestall potential opposition. Upon coming to power in 1993, however, Heydar Aliyev -like many post-Soviet leaders -inherited a genuine, existing opposition in the Popular Front movement. I suggest that in the presence of an intractable opposition, Azerbaijan's rulers have taken a different approach with regard to regime maintenance. Drawing on over 50 original interviews conducted during 6 months of field research, I identify the mechanisms by which the government has "hidden the opposition in plain sight" by making it effectively difficult for existing opposition groups to function as credible political parties. Since the mid-1990s, the Aliyev regime has used informal measures to prevent these groups from aggregating and articulating the diverse interests present in society from visibly competing in elections and from serving effectively in government to craft and implement policy. These practices have rendered the opposition technically legal, but completely ineffective. Besides weakening the opposition, these measures produce a series of mutually reinforcing effects -including noncompetitive elections by default and a politically disengaged society -that sustain long term regime stability. The paper concludes by examining this argument in comparative perspective. Hegemonic regimes have proliferated in the post-Soviet region, and I suggest that this strategy is an important factor in sustaining many of these regimes.

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“…To date, however, the impact of the international economy on Kyrgyzstan's domestic political developments remains largely overlooked. Building on existing studies of patron-client networks in Kyrgyzstan, this paper refocuses attention on how opportunities to participate in international markets influence political and economic decisions at the domestic level (Engvall 2011;Lewis 2011;Radnitz 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Global money laundering and its domestic political consequences in Kyrgyzstan

Marat

2015

Central Asian Survey

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This paper examines how Kyrgyzstan's two post-communist political regimes used offshore accounts to launder money and broker lucrative deals with international business partners. It argues that easy access to global financial institutions and availability of offshore markets strengthens a corrupt regime's grip on both political and economic matters and gives regime members a feeling of invincibility both domestically and globally. Offshore connections contributed to the emergence of a vast shadow economy inside Kyrgyzstan that includes clandestine hydropower exports, manipulations in the financial sector, and organized crime. The paper particularly focuses on the non-state actors who served as brokers to mediate connections between regime incumbents and international markets.

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The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic Dispersion, and the Post-Soviet “Revolutions”

Cited by 40 publications

References 12 publications

The Barriers to Intra-Opposition Cooperation in the Post-Communist World: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan

The Barriers to Intra-Opposition Cooperation in the Post-Communist World: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan

Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan

Global money laundering and its domestic political consequences in Kyrgyzstan

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