The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right

Mahoney, Paul G.

doi:10.1086/322053

Cited by 369 publications

(114 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…The legal origin theory is consistent with a political economy view because it considers that institutions depend on political determinants, in particular on the dominant ideologies in France and England on the roles in the society of the King/Queen, Parliament, Judges and individuals. Indeed, Mahoney (:504) writes, “English common law developed because landed aristocrats and merchants wanted a system of law that would provide strong protections for property and contract rights, and limit the crown's ability to interfere in markets”. By contrast, “French civil law developed as it did because the revolutionary generation, and Napoleon after it, wished to use state power to alter property rights and attempted to insure that judges did not interfere” (Mahoney :505).…”

Section: Motivation: Counter‐examples Of the Legal Origin Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, Mahoney (:504) writes, “English common law developed because landed aristocrats and merchants wanted a system of law that would provide strong protections for property and contract rights, and limit the crown's ability to interfere in markets”. By contrast, “French civil law developed as it did because the revolutionary generation, and Napoleon after it, wished to use state power to alter property rights and attempted to insure that judges did not interfere” (Mahoney :505). Accordingly, legal families differ in terms of the ‘political priority’ they gave to private property rights relative to the rights of the state: a civil law system tends to centralize and intensify state power and therefore takes a more wary stance toward the development of free financial systems than a common law system (cf.…”

Section: Motivation: Counter‐examples Of the Legal Origin Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Learning from the Swiss Corporate Governance Exception

Vatiero¹

2017

Kyklos

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Summary The Swiss economy represents an exception to the legal origin theory (e.g., Roe, 2006). Although Switzerland is a country belonging to the civil law family, many of its public companies have diffused corporate ownership, as do those in common law countries. This paper maintains that the Swiss exception relies on the complementarity between corporate ownership and policies addressing employment protection and innovation. The Swiss case presents two lessons. First, the current corporate governance is the result of a long and composite path in which politics plays a pivotal role; second, the institutional differences and similarities across countries, which one would try to explain along with the legal origin theory, can also emerge from politics‐based accounts, such as those referring to policies on employment protection and innovation.

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Section: Motivation: Counter‐examples Of the Legal Origin Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Motivation: Counter‐examples Of the Legal Origin Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning from the Swiss Corporate Governance Exception

Vatiero¹

2017

Kyklos

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“…The administration is less bounded by laws and regulations. The formation, reform, and abolition of government structures and policy processes in response to the change in context do not necessarily involve revision of laws, and are therefore more efficient (Mahoney 2001;Rubin 1977). The English heritage and the adoption of English as the defacto national language belp Singaporean officials easily absorb the best governance practice around the world.…”

Section: Governing Capacity Of Singapore and Macaomentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceived Threats and Governing Capacity

Chou

2014

Afr Asian Stud

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Many of the past literature on small states focus on the foreign policies and political economies of liberal democracies. This paper examines the non-liberal democracies of Singapore and Macao in their construction of national identities. Non-liberal democracies are different from their democratic counterparts in their reactions to perceived threats. Instead of forming a corporatist system to make important decisions by consensus, both Singapore and Macao leadership exclude the participation of civil society in defining their national identities. Faced with high perceived threats and armed with strong governing capacity, Singapore succeeds in building a national identity overarching the cultural identities of major ethnic groups. In view of electoral setbacks, Singapore leaders have to include more public inputs into its policy making process, including the definition of national identity. On the contrary, the perceived threats of Macao are not pressing. The cultural and political affinity enables the post-colonial Macao to integrate smoothly with China's national identities defined by the Communist leadership. The relative weak capacity of the city government makes the building of national identities gradual. Its high degree of ethnic homogeneity has contributed to a process of nation building relatively free of disputes.

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“…In this article, I provide the first empirical analysis of the quantification of noneconomic damages in medical malpractice appeals in Spanish administrative courts, where the state is the defendant, and in Spanish civil courts. Spain is a civil law tradition country, as are approximately two‐thirds of the legal systems worldwide (Mahoney ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One argument is that the civil law tradition “assumes a larger role for the state, defers more to bureaucratic decisions, and elevates collective over individual rights. It casts the judiciary into an explicitly subordinate role” (Mahoney : 511).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Medical Malpractice Appeals in a Civil Law System: Do Administrative and Civil Courts Award Noneconomic Damages Differently?

Amaral-Garcia¹

2019

Law Soc Rev

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How do courts award noneconomic damages? Does it matter if the state is the defendant? This article addresses these questions in the context of medical malpractice appeals to the Spanish Supreme Court. Moreover, this study provides the first empirical analysis of the quantification of noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases in administrative courts, where the state is the defendant, and in civil courts. This separation of jurisdictions is a common feature in civil law tradition countries. Yet, critics of this separation in general, and specialized courts in particular, argue that parties might be subject to different treatments and that similar cases might reach different outcomes, namely in terms of the quantification of damages. A consistent result of this paper is that no significant differences between noneconomic damages in civil and administrative appeals were found. The separation of jurisdictions does not necessarily imply that courts reach different outcomes, even when the state is the defendant. Citizens should not refrain from bringing their claims forward against the state, a more powerful party. In the current era of increasing juridification and judicialization of modern life (Ginsburg 2009; Hirschl 2006; Hirschl 2011), it is crucial for society that citizens and other parties litigating with the state are not disadvantageously treated.

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The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right

Cited by 369 publications

References 2 publications

Learning from the Swiss Corporate Governance Exception

Learning from the Swiss Corporate Governance Exception

Perceived Threats and Governing Capacity

Medical Malpractice Appeals in a Civil Law System: Do Administrative and Civil Courts Award Noneconomic Damages Differently?

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