The Common Property Nature of Market-inalienability

Thorne, Emanuel D.

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_2

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Kessel (1974) added that market mechanisms could provide guarantees for blood quality if accompanied by screening techniques to ensure product accountability. Interestingly, Thorne (2000) argued that with more effective exhortation, a donor system is capable of procuring more organs at lower costs than market procurement. More recently, Andreoni et al (2008, p. 134) argued that 'having a personal identity as an altruist might necessarily precede altruistic acts' and that the use of monetary rewards would conflict with such identity and hence have unintended effect on individuals' altruistic motivations.…”

Section: Blood Donation and Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kessel () added that market mechanisms could provide guarantees for blood quality if accompanied by screening techniques to ensure product accountability. Interestingly, Thorne () argued that with more effective exhortation, a donor system is capable of procuring more organs at lower costs than market procurement. More recently, Andreoni et al .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Not All Incentives Wash Out the Warm Glow: The Case of Blood Donation Revisited

Costa‐Font

Jofre‐Bonet

Yen

2013

Kyklos

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The issue of the nature of the altruism inherent in blood donation and the perverse effects of financial rewards for blood and/or organ donation has been recently revisited in the economic literature with limited consensus. As Titmuss (1970) famously pointed out, providing monetary incentives to blood donors may crowd out blood supply as purely altruistic donors may feel less inclined to donate if a reward is involved -in addition to having the effect of reducing blood quality. In this paper we examine how favouring different types of incentives are related to the likelihood of donating blood by exploiting a large sample representative of the population of fifteen European countries in 2002 containing information on both donation and attitudes towards incentives. Our results show those who have donated are less likely to favour monetary rewards for blood donation but are more likely to favour non-monetary ones. This is consistent with the idea that while monetary rewards may crowd out blood donation, non-monetary rewards do not.

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Section: Blood Donation and Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Not All Incentives Wash Out the Warm Glow: The Case of Blood Donation Revisited

Costa‐Font

Jofre‐Bonet

Yen

2013

Kyklos

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“…This article develops an economic model of the transplant care system within existing legal environments, with a particular emphasis on the organization of the production side of the system. The ban of organs markets makes transplants a common resource, collected mainly by "exhortation", that is, notably, by public calls for donation (Thorne (2000(Thorne ( , 2006). The bulk of the "resource" is constituted by brain-dead patients randomly distributed in hospitals through the statistical variety of death circumstances, and physically non-transferable for a variety of reasons that notably include the stringent legal obligations relative to the body of the deceased.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal production of transplant care services

Deffains

Ythier

2010

Journal of Public Economics

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“…As we see in chapter 5, Ontario's OPO, TGLN, engages in extensive asking for organs as part of the work of converting potential donors to actual donors. Following Thorne (2000), I use the term exhortation to describe this form of asking the public at large to advanced consent to deceased donation. Asking for organs as gifts is considered acceptable because it is generalizedthe organ will go to someone who is a stranger but a member of the community.…”

Section: Appropriate Askingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structured Forgetting and the Social Organization of Kidney Exchange in Ontario

McKay¹

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Theoretical resources regarding the creation of objects and orientations in ideology and material practice are drawn on to develop an original, theoretical account of organ transplantation. This analytical lens is then used to advance understanding of the social relations that enable and inhibit the exchange of kidneys for transplantation. The argument is that customary claims about how to increase organ donation, set within an altruism versus market framework, deflect attention from a significant variable: the legitimacy and limits of removing kidneys from their owners -in other words, alienability. Two sets of rules are revealed, with one set, the rules of altruism, requiring and eliciting public engagement, and the other set, the rules of alienability, being pushed by experts within their realm of authority. Both sets of rules demarcate boundary lines through a fundamental tension between recipients, intermediaries and donors that is demonstrated to be imbalanced by a recipient-centric orientation. As a result, public discourse is focused on a small set of variables and distanced from a far more complex set of dynamics predominantly emerging from the relationality of donors and recipients.

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The Common Property Nature of Market-inalienability

Cited by 3 publications

References 15 publications

Not All Incentives Wash Out the Warm Glow: The Case of Blood Donation Revisited

Not All Incentives Wash Out the Warm Glow: The Case of Blood Donation Revisited

Optimal production of transplant care services

Structured Forgetting and the Social Organization of Kidney Exchange in Ontario

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