The Commuter's Time-of-Use Decision and Optimal Pricing and Service in Urban Mass Transit

Kraus, Marvin; Yoshida, Yuichiro

doi:10.1006/juec.2001.2242

Cited by 82 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Note that, () tt cN can be regarded as a reduced form of the transit cost function for a model in which transit users are subject to schedule delay costs, and have a time-of-use decision to make (Kraus and Yoshida, 2002;Kraus, 2003). More complicated situations, e.g., when transit operator is responsive to parking supply or roadway capacity expansion (Zhang et al, 2014), might be considered in further study.…”

Section: Revised Paper Submitted To Transportmetrica A: Transport Scimentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing morning commute with parking space constraints in the case of a bi-modal many-to-one network

Liu

Zhang²,

Yang

2015

Transportmetrica A: Transport Science

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Recently, some studies examined how downtown parking space limitation re-shapes the morning commute in the case of a single origin-destination network. This paper further formulates and analyses the commuting equilibrium problem of both mode and departure time choices in a bi-modal (auto and public transit) many-to-one network. Several properties of the equilibrium under parking space constraints and the proposed parking reservation system are discussed. Procedures for computing the dynamic user equilibrium with a parking space constraint (either trading of reservations is allowed or not) have been developed. We show that parking reservation can help reduce deadweight loss due to parking competition and roadway congestion. We also found that assigning more reservations to travelers from a specific origin does not necessarily reduce total travel cost of them, while doing so might raise the total travel cost of travelers from other origins. When parking supply is less than the potential demand but is relatively large, it is socially preferred to retain some parking spaces open for competition. However, when the total parking supply is relatively small, all parking spaces should be reserved to travelers. Besides, we show trading of reservations among travelers would yield an efficiency loss. This loss can be fairly large thus trading should be prohibited.

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Section: Revised Paper Submitted To Transportmetrica A: Transport Scimentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing morning commute with parking space constraints in the case of a bi-modal many-to-one network

Liu

Zhang²,

Yang

2015

Transportmetrica A: Transport Science

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“…We use subscript i to indicate a group 2 With late arrivals, the effect on prices of the number of early and late train services is asymmetric and the exact form of the price equation depends on the ratio of the values of schedule delay early and late. Arnott and Kraus (1993;1995), Kraus and Yoshida (2002), and Kraus (2003) also use this simplification. Although the restriction of no late arrival is unrealistic; it does not affect the general results of the bottleneck (see Arnott and Kraus (1993, footnote 12)) or the crowding model.…”

Section: Ratio Heterogeneity and Pricing Of A Single Bottleneckmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…which implies that the number of users in service 1 is 7 The substitution of R(R-1)/2 for the series (1+2+...+R-1) follows Kraus and Yoshida (2002). …”

Section: Ratio Heterogeneity and Rail Pricingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Congesting Pricing in a Road and Rail Network with Heterogeneous Values of Time and Schedule Delay

Berg

Verhoef

2011

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe analyse congestion pricing in a road and rail network, where the two modes are imperfect substitutes. On the road there is bottleneck congestion; in each train there is crowding congestion. We model two dimensions of preference heterogeneity, where these two dimensions have opposite effects on the welfare impact of congestion pricing and lead to different distributional effects. The distributional effects also differ between road and rail. On the road, pricing is generally more beneficial with a higher value of time or schedule delay. In the train, pricing has no distributional effects or is less beneficial with a higher value.JEL codes: D62, H23, L11, R41, R48

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“…Under this perspective, as long as the saturation point of PT is not reached (Kraus and Yoshida (2002)), increasing PT usage should almost always lead to a societal gain. In fact, with more individuals sharing the fixed costs of PT provision, there will be economies of scale, such as a higher frequency of vehicles in the PT network (Mohring (1972), Proost and Dender (2008)).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Estimating Crowding Costs in Public Transport

Haywood

Koning

2013

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in April 2013Abstract Preferences for transport activities are often considered only in terms of time and money. Whilst congestion in automobile traffic increases costs by raising trip durations, the same is less obvious in public transport (PT), especially rail-based. This has lead many economic analyses to conclude that there exists a free lunch by reducing the attractiveness of automobile transport at no (or little) cost for PT users. This article argues that congestion in PT -crowding -is also costly. Using survey data from the Paris metro we estimate the degree to which users value comfort in terms of less crowding. Using a contingent valuation method (CVM) we describe marginal willingness to pay over different parts of the distribution of in-vehicle crowding and consider moderating factors. We conclude that the total welfare cost for a trip rises from e 2.42 for a seated passenger to e 3.69 under the most congested conditions. We apply our results to the cost-benefit analysis of a recent investment in PT in Paris and consider broader implications for transport policy. In particular, we highlight that PT congestion is a first-order urban externality.

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The Commuter's Time-of-Use Decision and Optimal Pricing and Service in Urban Mass Transit

Cited by 82 publications

References 9 publications

Managing morning commute with parking space constraints in the case of a bi-modal many-to-one network

Managing morning commute with parking space constraints in the case of a bi-modal many-to-one network

Congesting Pricing in a Road and Rail Network with Heterogeneous Values of Time and Schedule Delay

Estimating Crowding Costs in Public Transport

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