The Comparative Failure of Machine Politics, Administrative Resources and Fraud

Zimmer, Kerstin

doi:10.1080/00085006.2005.11092392

Cited by 22 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Until the Euromaidan, nationalist mobilization in Ukraine remained confined to Ukrainian speakers while the Russian‐speaking population remained passive. Western Ukrainians led the way in mobilizing against the Soviet regime in the late 1980s through 1991, during the 2000–2001 Kuchmagate crisis when President Leonid Kuchma was implicated in the murder of journalist Georgi Gongadze, the 2004 Orange Revolution, and 2013–2014 Euromaidan (Kuzio ; Kuzio ; Zimmer ). Ethnic Ukrainian national identity was more successful in mobilizing Ukrainians because the identity of Russians and Russian speakers was grounded not in ethno‐cultural resources but territorially, as in Russia itself…”

Section: Theories Of Nationalisms In the Russian And Ukrainian Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competing Nationalisms, Euromaidan, and the Russian‐Ukrainian Conflict

Kuzio

2015

Studies Ethnicity & National

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Section: Theories Of Nationalisms In the Russian And Ukrainian Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competing Nationalisms, Euromaidan, and the Russian‐Ukrainian Conflict

Kuzio

2015

Studies Ethnicity & National

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“…Although the Party of Regions emerged in 2000 and went on to win three parliamentary elections in 2006, 2007 and 2012 and one presidential election in 2010, Western scholarly interest has been abysmal and confined to Zimmer (2005), Osipan and Osipan (2006) and Zimmer and Haran (2008). The only study of the Party of Regions as Ukraine's first and only political machine (Kudelia and Kuzio, 2014) was published just as the party disintegrated following the overthrow of Yanukovych in February 2014, Russian occupation of the Crimea and violent separatism in the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts).…”

Section: Ukrainian Party Development In Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Impediments to the Emergence of Political Parties in Ukraine

Kuzio

2014

Politics

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This article analyses why, after a quarter of century of post-Soviet transition, political parties in Ukraine remain weak. Ukraine's newly elected President Petro Poroshenko and his ally Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko both lead virtual political parties. The weakness of Ukrainian political parties is analysed through five impediments to their development: Soviet political culture; corruption and cynicism; provincial elites; regional and linguistic diversity; and weak party structure. The Soviet legacy has left an ideological wasteland in Eurasia upon which it has proven difficult to build political parties. The absence of pre-Soviet party roots from which to draw makes Eurasia different from the three Baltic States and Eastern Europe, while the late Soviet 'era of stagnation' and rapid, often violent and corrupt drive to a market economy in the 1990s deepened cynicism and corruption. The Soviet legacy of provincialism in non-Russian republics such as Ukraine remains predominant among business and political elites. Regional and linguistic diversity has negatively impacted on the ability of political parties to garner support throughout the country, undermining national integration, as seen during the Eastern Ukrainian violent counter-revolution in Donetsk, home base of the Party of Regions. Ukraine's parties remain structurally weak in their top-down approach and there is an absence of internal democracy, disrespect for voters and reliance on opaque sources of funding.

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“…Moreover, in many cases, third-party movements that use clientelistic strategies to guarantee their continuation in power have replaced traditional political parties. We perform a journalistic and scholar literature review that characterizes the behavior of these third-party political movements as political machines: “organizations, headed by a single boss or a small autocratic group, which controls enough votes to sustain political and administrative control of a city, county, or state” (Zimmer, 2015, p. 363) (See also: Stokes et al , 2013; and Scott, 1962). This is a context where, on the one hand, citizens do not electorally punish political machines, and on the other, clientelism acquires a particular local expression (Mansour et al , 2021; Robinson, 2016; Eaton and Chambers, 2014; Eaton, 2006; Eduardo and Muñloz, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political machines and the curse of public resources in subnational democracies

Cendales

Garza

Arcila

2021

JES

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PurposeThis paper argues that decentralization reforms in Colombia, implemented since the 1980s, have led to the decentralization of political clientelism rather than its demise. Clientelism is a system of political and economic institutions that turns every local democracy into an extractive political institution. The authors theoretically demonstrate that an increase in public resources will increase corruption.Design/methodology/approachThe authors develop and test a subnational public choice model, where clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration constitute a stable long-term institutional equilibrium. The model comprises two linked subgames: electoral tournament and corruption in public policy. The model makes two predictions that currently oppose predominant approaches: (1) increasing the severity of jail sentences to electoral crimes increases their price and the predominance of machine politics, instead of improving the quality of electoral tournaments and (2) increasing local governments' public finance increases clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration.FindingsThe authors find evidence in favor of the theoretical model of curse of public resources, using difference-in-differences estimation with a database 2016–17 of Colombia's 1,034 municipalities. This country is well-suited for our analysis because it has a long-term commitment to formal democratic processes (since 1958), while plagued by endemic corruption and clientelism problems.Originality/value(1) The theoretical approach is innovative and disruptive of current models on the problem, (2) the model builds upon the Colombian situation, a country with prominent corruption and political violence problems regardless of its relatively long-term commitment with free elections (since 1958) and (3) the theoretical discussion is tested using a comprehensive set of difference-in-differences estimations.

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The Comparative Failure of Machine Politics, Administrative Resources and Fraud

Cited by 22 publications

References 0 publications

Competing Nationalisms, Euromaidan, and the Russian‐Ukrainian Conflict

Competing Nationalisms, Euromaidan, and the Russian‐Ukrainian Conflict

Impediments to the Emergence of Political Parties in Ukraine

Political machines and the curse of public resources in subnational democracies

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