1997
DOI: 10.1287/opre.45.1.54
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The Competitive Newsboy

Abstract: We consider a competitive version of the classical newsboy problem—in which a firm must choose an inventory or production level for a perishable good with random demand, and the optimal solution is a fractile of the demand distribution—and investigate the impact of competition upon industry inventory. A splitting rule specifies how initial industry demand is allocated among competing firms and how any excess demand is allocated among firms with remaining inventory. We examine the relation between equilibrium i… Show more

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Cited by 389 publications
(293 citation statements)
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“…Bashyam (1996) considers capacity expansion in a two-stage setting akin to a static newsvendor network but with private, Bayesian demandinformation updating. Lippman and McCardle (1997) show how a newsvendor critical-fractile solution extends to a competitive setting with multiple agents supplying a single market with fixed-price and univariate demand uncertainty. That solution critically depends on the "splitting rules" that specify how initial demand is allocated among competing firms and how any excess demand is allocated among firms with remaining capacity (or inventory).…”
Section: Game-theoretic Capacity Investment Bymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bashyam (1996) considers capacity expansion in a two-stage setting akin to a static newsvendor network but with private, Bayesian demandinformation updating. Lippman and McCardle (1997) show how a newsvendor critical-fractile solution extends to a competitive setting with multiple agents supplying a single market with fixed-price and univariate demand uncertainty. That solution critically depends on the "splitting rules" that specify how initial demand is allocated among competing firms and how any excess demand is allocated among firms with remaining capacity (or inventory).…”
Section: Game-theoretic Capacity Investment Bymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Payoff functions having the supermodularity property and the related property of increasing differences make many games brimming with special properties; see e.g., Topkis (1979), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Vives (1990), and Lippman and McCardle (1997) as references.…”
Section: Background Knowledgementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Modularity can also be used for postponing differentiation points and inventory pooling (see, e.g., Ramdas 2003 for a summary), which may also reduce overhead cost and affect production costs (a violation of Assumption 3). Explicitly modeling a multiproduct inventory decision involves many technical concerns, such as demand rationing when stockouts occur (see, e.g., Lippman andMcCardle 1997, Netessine andRudi 2003), and hence needs further investigation. Including economies of scale in production would also make the comparison with empirical work (e.g., Srinivasan 1990, Bayus andPutsis 1999) more appropriate.…”
Section: Conclusion and Further Workmentioning
confidence: 99%