The complexity of theory of mind

Bosco, Francesca; Colle, Livia; Tirassa, Maurizio

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.12.007

Cited by 20 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…This result seems to suggest that when player C watches player A acting unfairly, he tries to understand the intentions or goals behind the in-group member’s unfair behavior in order to justify it. Our results are in line with the relevant literature showing that these two brain regions are key components of the mentalizing network, involved in inferring goals, intentions, desires, as well as more enduring dispositions of others [29–32], [27], [63–65], [28]. In addition to this network, we observed increased activity of the caudate nucleus.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Group Membership Modulates the Neural Circuitry Underlying Third Party Punishment

et al. 2016

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This research aims to explore the neural correlates involved in altruistic punishment, parochial altruism and anti-social punishment, using the Third-Party Punishment (TPP) game. In particular, this study considered these punishment behaviors in in-group vs. out-group game settings, to compare how people behave with members of their own national group and with members of another national group. The results showed that participants act altruistically to protect in-group members. This study indicates that norm violation in in-group (but not in out-group) settings results in increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and temporo-parietal junction, brain regions involved in the mentalizing network, as the third-party attempts to understand or justify in-group members’ behavior. Finally, exploratory analysis during anti-social punishment behavior showed brain activation recruitment of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area associated with altered regulation of emotions.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Group Membership Modulates the Neural Circuitry Underlying Third Party Punishment

et al. 2016

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“… Frith (1992) was the first to propose that a deficit of ToM could explain the cognitive and behavioral abnormalities of schizophrenia. This hypothesis was widely confirmed (e.g., Corcoran et al, 1995 , 1997 ; Frith and Corcoran, 1996 ; Sarfati and Hardy-Baylé, 1999 ; Mazza et al, 2001 ; Brüne, 2005 ; Bosco et al, 2009 ). Specifically, Frith (1992) proposed to explain the communicative-pragmatic deficit of schizophrenia as the consequence of a primary ToM deficit.…”

Section: Empirical Studies Of the Relationship Between Pragmatics Andmentioning

confidence: 69%

“…As far as the relationship between ToM and pragmatics is concerned, several authors have stressed that the ability to understand someone’s mental states and their relation with behavior is an undisputed requirement of human communication ( Happé and Loth, 2002 ; Sperber and Wilson, 2002 ; Tirassa et al, 2006a , b ; Bosco et al, 2009 ; Cummings, 2015 ). For example, the ability to deceive in communication has been commonly explained based on the ability to understand and foresee the interlocutor’s mental states ( Peskin, 1996 ; Polak and Harris, 1999 ; Lee, 2000 ; Ma et al, 2015 ).…”

Section: Empirical Studies Of the Relationship Between Pragmatics Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Pragmatics and Theory of Mind Do Not (Completely) Overlap

2018

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Aim of the paper is to discuss the extent to which pragmatics, i.e., the ability to use language and other expressive means to convey meaning in a specific interactional context, overlaps with Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e., the ability to ascribe mental states to oneself and the others. We present empirical data available in the current literature concerning the relation between these two faculties, with specific reference to the developmental and clinical domains. Part of the literature we take into account appears to show that ToM does correlate with pragmatic ability; however, other studies appear to show that pragmatic ability alone cannot explain the empirical differences of performance across different kinds of pragmatic tasks, and therefore that another, at least partially different faculty is required to account for human communication. We argue that to conceive pragmatics as a sort of subcomponent of ToM, and thus to conflate or reduce the notion of pragmatics into the (wider) notion of ToM, is not theoretically correct and a possible cause of methodological confusion in the relevant empirical research. It thus turns out to be necessary that the two faculties be investigated with separate theories as well as different experimental tasks.

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“… Gallagher (2006) notes that ToM approaches to the explanation of how we come to understand others typically are abstract (third-person when they need to be second-person), mentalistic (starting with the supposition that there are things like minds, beliefs, desires that we have no access to in others, and sometimes even in ourselves), and biased toward theoretical reason (when practical, situated reason is a better way to go: see also Bosco et al, 2009b ). Overly intellectualizing what is involved in our basic encounters with others, they tend to forget emotion and our ability to read it not in the minds of others, but on their faces, as well as in their gestures and expressive movements.…”

Section: From Childhood To Adolescencementioning

confidence: 99%

“No more a child, not yet an adult”: studying social cognition in adolescence

et al. 2015

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There are several reasons why adolescence is interesting. It is in this phase that an individual finds herself fully facing the external world: basically equipped with the kind of social cognition that s/he has acquired at home, at school and through the media during childhood, s/he has now to meet a host of other, diverse views of what “reasonable,” “appropriate,” or “expected” courses of thought and emotions are, in the wild with friends and peers, romantic or sexual partners, teachers and employers, and the society at large. Furthermore, she is also expected, both at home and in the external world, to have a wholly new degree of control over such courses. While the idea that the development of social cognition still progresses after infancy (and possibly throughout the life span) is clearly gaining consensus in the field, the literature building on it is still scarce. One of the reasons for this probably is that most tests used to study it focus on its basic component, namely theory of mind, and have been mostly devised for us with children; therefore, they are not suitable to deal with the hugely increasing complexity of social and mental life during adolescence and adulthood. Starting from a review of the literature available, we will argue that the development of social cognition should be viewed as a largely yet-to-be-understood mix of biological and cultural factors. While it is widely agreed upon that the very initial manifestations of social life in the newborn are largely driven by an innate engine with which all humans are equally endowed, it is also evident that each culture, and each individual within it, develops specific adult versions of social cognition.

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The complexity of theory of mind

Cited by 20 publications

References 14 publications

Group Membership Modulates the Neural Circuitry Underlying Third Party Punishment

Group Membership Modulates the Neural Circuitry Underlying Third Party Punishment

Why Pragmatics and Theory of Mind Do Not (Completely) Overlap

“No more a child, not yet an adult”: studying social cognition in adolescence

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