The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy

Baysinger, Barry D.; Hoskisson, Robert E.

doi:10.2307/258106

Cited by 416 publications

(232 citation statements)

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“…This concentration of power may damage the company's corporate transparency and lead to the generation of poor-quality information (Simon and Wong, 2001;Forker, 1992). Gandía (2008) believes COB-CEO duality to be detrimental to a company, and that the separation of these positions tends to increase the effectiveness of the board, promoting a greater willingness by the COB to advise the CEO and enhancing independence between the board and corporate governance (Fama and Jensen, 1983;Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990;Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Therefore, the hypothesis proposed is as follows:…”

Section: Cob-ceo Dualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Information Transparency on the Internet by Listed Companies in Spain (IBEX35) and Mexico (IPYC)

Turrent¹,

Ariza²

2012

IJDAR

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Abstract. Financial and non-financial disclosure play a central role in the functioning of capital markets. In this context, the Internet has been adopted as an effective mechanism for large companies to disseminate corporate information. The institutional theory approach has been applied to identify both formal (fundamentally legal and economic) and informal factors that significantly influence listed companies' level of corporate transparency on the Internet. Our work aims to build on existing study by focusing on two main objectives. Firstly, to make a comparative study of the corporate transparency of listed companies from Mexico and Spain by creating an index of corporate transparency on the Internet (e-CTI). And secondly, to identify the factors that affect this index using multiple regression analysis. Our study population is comprised of 70 companies, of which 35 belong to the Mexican Price and Quotations Index (IPyC) and 35 to the Spanish IBEX 35 index. The descriptive analysis reveals significant differences in the level of information disclosure between the two countries. The companies listed in Mexico obtain an e-CTI of 59%, while the Spanish ones register 80%, i.e. more importance is assigned to the disclosure of corporate governance data in Spain than in Mexico. Furthermore, this analysis shows that the factors most telling with regards to corporate transparency are the strength and application of law, GDP per capita, inflation and firm-level variables such as ownership concentration and Chairman of the Board-Chief Executive Officer (COB-CEO) duality. However, other variables such as board size and composition, profitability, leverage and firm size are not significant for the purposes of this analysis. Our work is of great relevance today, since most studies have focused on developed countries, mainly in the U.S. and Europe, with few comparisons being made between developed and developing countries, such as Spain and Mexico.

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Section: Cob-ceo Dualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Information Transparency on the Internet by Listed Companies in Spain (IBEX35) and Mexico (IPYC)

Turrent¹,

Ariza²

2012

IJDAR

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“…This further improves the quality of public disclosure and lowers both the benefits of private information collection by outside speculators and overall private information abuse risk faced by uninformed investors (Zhang, 2001). Family leadership can improve the ability of the board to process information not only because family shareholders are informed about the firm's operations, R&D, and other strategic issues (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990;Gomes-Mejia et al, 2003), but also because they internalize information flows between management and the board, which can reduce any risk of misunderstanding and poor strategic decision-making.…”

Section: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiple agency perspective, family control, and private information abuse in an emerging economy

2010

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“…Outside directors are better monitors of management as ''insider-dominated boards imply problematic self-monitoring and particularly weak monitoring of the CEO, since the CEO is likely to be in a position to influence the insider directors' career advancement within the firm'' (Zajac and Westphal, 1994, p. 125). Outside directors are also presumed to bring a level of impartiality in evaluating management's decisions (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Unlike insiders, outside directors are less likely to be affected by the outcomes of their decisions and thus can arrive at more objective solutions (Rechner et al, 1993).…”

Section: Board Independencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Has It Brought About Changes in the Boards of Large U. S. Corporations?

Valenti

2007

J Bus Ethics

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The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy

Cited by 416 publications

References 0 publications

Corporate Information Transparency on the Internet by Listed Companies in Spain (IBEX35) and Mexico (IPYC)

Corporate Information Transparency on the Internet by Listed Companies in Spain (IBEX35) and Mexico (IPYC)

Multiple agency perspective, family control, and private information abuse in an emerging economy

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Has It Brought About Changes in the Boards of Large U. S. Corporations?

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