The Concept of Truth

Abstract

Davidson discussed the concept of truth consistently throughout his career. It is central to the early Davidson (1967), and to the late Davidson (2005a). His views on the subject are not absolutely static. At one point, he endorses a version of the correspondence theory of truth, and he comes to emphatically reject that view later. At one point he calls his view a coherence theory of truth, and he later comes to doubt that characterization. Even so, over the period of nearly 40 years that he wrestled with questions about the nature of truth, Davidson is remarkably consistent. Certain points appear early in his thinking and remain constant: Tarski's work on truth is fundamental to understanding the concept, as is the relation of truth to meaning, and we fail to understand that connection adequately unless we take into account the constraints of radical interpretation. Furthermore, in understanding those connections, we see that truth is not a redundant or trivial concept, but equally it is not a locus for metaphysical commitments. Actually, I shall suggest that a stronger conclusion about these points is in order. Not only are they stable points of Davidson's view; they are his view. By his later writings, it becomes clear that we understand the concept of truth through these features of it, and we should not hope for a more direct definition of the concept. This essay will review Davidson's main work on truth, more or less in chronological order. It will focus on the ways the connections between truth, meaning, and

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