The Condorcet-Jefferson connection and the origins of social choice theory

Urken, Arnold B.

doi:10.1007/bf00123745

Cited by 44 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…... We have not observed any recognition of the repulsive peculiarities by which it is so undesirably distinguished." Yet recognition did come [5] some 170 years later for ideas on systems of voting within that book, of which an annotated English translation is now in preparation. Little known even…”

Section: School Of Mathematics and Statistics F 07 The University Ofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Condorcet. Arithmétique politique. Textes rares ou inédits (1767–1789). Critical edition commented by Bernard Bru and Pierre Crépel

Seneta

1999

Historia Mathematica

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Section: School Of Mathematics and Statistics F 07 The University Ofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Condorcet. Arithmétique politique. Textes rares ou inédits (1767–1789). Critical edition commented by Bernard Bru and Pierre Crépel

Seneta

1999

Historia Mathematica

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“…Applications of this model are relevant to a wide variety of areas, such as medicine, law, management and others (cf. McLean and Hewitt [21], Nurmi [24], Grofman and Owen [14], Berend, Sapir and Sapir [9], Urken [30]). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Algorithmic Calculation of the Optimality Probability of Decision Rules

2009

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We study the dichotomous choice model under conditions of uncertainty. In this model, a committee of decision makers is required to select one of two alternatives, of which exactly one is correct. A decision rule translates the individual opinions into a group decision. We focus on the direction concerned with the identification of the optimal decision rule under partial information on the decision skills. Namely, we assume the correctness probabilities of the committee members to be independent random variables, selected from some given distribution. In addition, we assume that the ranking of the members in the committee is known. Thus, one can follow rules based on this ranking.One of the commonly used measures of the efficiency of a decision rule is its probability of being optimal. Here we provide a method for an explicit calculation of this probability for any given weighted majority rule for a wide family of distribution functions. Moreover, under the assumption of exponentially distributed decision skills, we provide an improved algorithm for this calculation. We illustrate our results with various examples.

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“…The social choice theory is buried in a few pages of the enormous Essai, and is not clearly related to the probabilistic conclusions of the bulk of the analysis. For this reason, most commentators, following Black (1958), have been stymied by an apparent dualism between the probabilistic and social choice content in Condorcet's theory, though recent analysts have discerned a unifying framework (see Urken, 1991).…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%