The Consequences of Astroturf Lobbying for Trust and Authenticity. Findings and Implications from an Experiment

Abstract

In contrast to authentic grassroots activism, in astroturfing, lobbyists sponsor an interest group that pretends to be a grassroots movement. In a vignette-based experiment, we investigate for the first time how astroturfing, compared to grassroots lobbying, reflects on stakeholders' perceptions of organizational trust and authenticity, how perceived frequency of the practices relates to them, and the associations they trigger. Our results indicate that stakeholders perceive an astroturfing organization as barely trustful and authentic, even less so if the practice is perceived as occurring more frequently. Astroturfing triggered negative associations of manipulation. Such perceptions damage organizations' trustful relationships with their publics.

The game of goodwill: an exploratory study of discursive goodwill strategies of interest organizations in a consensus democracy

“…The good relations mentioned in the introduction can also involve an element of trust-the coping mechanism used when sufficient information or expertise is lacking but a decision needs to be made (Siegrist and Cvetkovich 2000). Should for instance lobbyists be trusted when they run Astroturf campaigns, advocate self-regulation or engage in the phenomenon of 'revolving doors' (Holman and Luneburg 2012;Lock and Seele 2017;Ron and Singer 2019)? Trust involves a moral dimension, but should not be confused with trustworthiness (Hardin 1996(Hardin , 2002.…”

Poisoning the Well: How Astroturfing Harms Trust in Advocacy Organizations

“…What these campaigns share is an outsized presence of external patrons, a linked advocacy group that presents itself as largely independent, and some exposure taking place that makes outside audiences question that apparent independence. While it is quite likely and expected that exposures would lead many public audiences to discredit the revealed front group and sponsor (Lock and Seele 2017; Pfau et al 2007), what is less clear is whether this affects public trust in advocacy groups writ large. For this, our analytic expectations rely upon prior research on categorical stigmatization processes, to which we turn next.…”

“…In our case, we expect (and hypothesize below) that the disclosure that a low-reputation organization was orchestrating an astroturf campaign should be more harmful than a similar disclosure regarding a high-reputation sponsor, because observers will assume that such practices are more widespread than the case at hand, and that unsavory (and less trustworthy) actors are often behind them. Although other studies have shown that the revelation of front-group strategies generates significant reputational fallout (Lock and Seele 2017; Pfau et al 2007), our study is the first to examine how organizational reputations may shape overall perceptions of trust in advocacy groups; this is important conceptually because it provides an understanding of an additional layer of “guilt by association” effects (e.g., Pontikes, Negro, and Rao 2010).…”

“…The core astroturfing strategy is the creation of “front groups” that simulate the appearance of an independent association, but which are funded and staffed by an outside patron, such as a corporation, industry group, or wealthy individual (Givel and Glantz 2001; Lock and Seele 2017; Pfau et al 2007). Prominent examples of front groups include Know Your Power (a front for energy firms; see Mix and Waldo 2015); the National Wetlands Coalition (a front for real estate and utility firms against environmental regulations; see Pfau et al 2007), and Coalition for an Affordable City (a front for beverage industry interests fighting soda taxes; see Somji et al 2016).…”

Gauging the Rigor of Qualitative Case Studies in Comparative Lobbying Research. A Framework and Guideline for Research and Analysis

“…Enrichment : Public affairs practice is at its core about managing relationships (Fleisher, ) that are composed of various sequences of interpersonal, interorganizational, and organization‐public communication (Ledingham, ). Actors in public affairs such as lobbyists have a strategic goal they try to pursue through communication (Lock & Seele, ). Thus, it is only consistent to study public affairs cases also based on theoretical findings and perspectives from strategic communication research, or, more broadly, communication science, because public affairs relies on effective communication (Harris & Fleisher, ).…”