The consequences of suggesting false childhood food events

Bernstein, Daniel M.; Scoboria, Alan; Arnold, Robert W.

doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2015.01.001

Cited by 35 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Our experiments support this view inasmuch as we successfully manipulated participants' beliefs while recollections were retained. Based on the independence of these two components, it is proposed that belief in the occurrence of an event, rather than a specific memory for the event, is highly malleable and is the critical component in influencing behavior (Bernstein et al, 2015;Scoboria et al, 2014). Importantly, we found that for false memories, undermining belief led to a reduction in subsequent problem-solving behavior, a finding that accords well with the above proposition.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 80%

“…This is in line with previous research suggesting belief in the occurrence of past events was more important in determining eating behavior than recollection (Bernstein et al, 2015). However, in this work, no experimental test was performed to manipulate belief separately and examine whether this would impact behavior.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 76%

“…Recently, Bernstein, Scoboria, and Arnold (2015) conducted a mega-analysis on previously published food-preference experiments (see above) and concluded that for false events, belief is more important than memory in modifying food preference. Indeed, they stated that, "[c]ompared to memory of past events, belief in the occurrence of past events is more important for altering attitudes and behaviors" (p. 6).…”

Section: Undermining Belief In False Memories Leads To Less Efficientmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Undermining belief in false memories leads to less efficient problem-solving behaviour

Otgaar

Howe

Smeets

et al. 2016

Memory

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This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link AbstractMemories of events for which the belief in the occurrence of those events is undermined, but recollection is retained, are called nonbelieved memories (NBMs). The present experiments examined the effects of NBMs on subsequent problem-solving behavior. In Experiment 1, we challenged participants' beliefs in their memories and examined whether NBMs affected subsequent solution rates on insight-based problems. True and false memories were elicited using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Then participants' belief in true and false memories was challenged by telling them the item had not been presented. We found that when the challenge led to undermining belief in false memories, fewer problems were solved than when belief was not challenged. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used except that some participants solved the problems one week rather than immediately after the feedback. Again, our results showed that undermining belief in false memories resulted in lower problem solution rates. These findings suggest that for false memories, belief is an important agent in whether memories serve as effective primes for immediate and delayed problem-solving.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 80%

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 76%

Section: Undermining Belief In False Memories Leads To Less Efficientmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Undermining belief in false memories leads to less efficient problem-solving behaviour

Otgaar

Howe

Smeets

et al. 2016

Memory

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“…Coming to believe an event is a genuine part of the past is sufficient to lead to changes in views of the self and behavior (e.g., Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). The findings in Bernstein et al (2015) indicate that once an event is sufficiently believed to have occurred, development of recollection does not contribute further to behavioral outcomes. In other words, belief in the occurrence of an event may be sufficient to influence behavior, whether or not there is also an accompanying episodic recollection.…”

Section: False Autobiographical Beliefmentioning

confidence: 62%

“…Mega-analysis has been increasingly used in areas such as genetics, neuroimaging, and treatment of psychopathology (e.g., de Maat et al, 2008;Hallahan, et al, 2011;see Sternberg et al, 2006, for a study of the effects of family violence on child behavior, in which combining data from multiple studies permitted asking of new questions). Bernstein, Scoboria, and Arnold (2015) published a mega-analysis (8 studies;…”

Section: Approach To Combining the Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation studies

Scoboria

Wade

Lindsay

et al. 2016

Memory

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(2016) A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation studies. Memory, 25 (2). pp. 146-163. Permanent WRAP URL:http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/83729 Copyright and reuse:The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made available.Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. A note on versions:The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the 'permanent WRAP URL' above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription. In Press, Memory, November 9, 2016. This is not the official copy of record; the final published version may differ slightly.Author note: Please direct correspondence to A. Scoboria, Department of Psychology, 401 Sunset, Windsor, Ontario, Canada, N9B 3P4, scoboria@uwindsor.ca; K. Wade, Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, University Road, Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom, K.A.Wade@warwick.ac.uk; S. Lindsay, Department of Psychology, University of Victoria, 3800 Finnerty Road, Victoria BC, Canada,V8W 2Y2, slindsay@uvic.ca. This research was supported by a Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada Discovery Grant to the first author (RGPIN/327570−2012). The authors thank the many research assistants who contributed to this research. RUNNING HEAD: Mega-analysis of False Memory Reports… 2 AbstractUnderstanding that suggestive practices can promote false beliefs and false memories for childhood events is important in many settings (e.g., psychotherapeutic, medical, legal). The generalizability of findings from memory implantation studies has been questioned due to variability in estimates across studies. Such variability is partly due to false memories having been operationalized differently across studies and to differences in memory induction techniques. We explored ways of defining false memory based on memory science and developed a reliable coding system that we applied to reports from eight published implantation studies (N=423). Independent raters coded transcripts using seven criteria: accepting the suggestion, elaboration beyond the suggestion, imagery, coherence, emotion, memory statements, and not rejecting the suggestion. Using this scheme, 30.4% of cases were classified as false memories and another 23% wer...

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