The consequences of the fragmented military in Iraqi Kurdistan

Hama, Hawre Hasan

doi:10.1080/13530194.2019.1582321

Cited by 3 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…As Hama (2015) mentioned that because of the lack of politic and economic unsustainability, several wars in the region and long lasted dictator regime negatively affected developments in the region. Following this further, governments could not provide equal services for the public as well (Hama, 2015;2019). However, in contrast to Hofstede index Rarick et al (2014) and Hassan (2015) found that Kurds in Iraq have lower level of "Power Distance".…”

Section: Results Of Hofstede's Cultural Study About Iraqmentioning

confidence: 97%

Effectiveness of Transformational Leadership among Different Cultures

Poturak¹,

Mekić²,

Hadžiahmetović³

et al. 2020

IJSSES

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Culture is shared assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, or beliefs that helps individuals or groups to respond various actions or events that they face in daily life. Besides, leadership is art of influencing others to achieve desired objectives in organizations. On one hand, the growing body of the literature argues the effectiveness of the transformational leadership. On the other hand, cultural background has different impacts on this leadership style. In this respect, current paper aims to point out some consequences of transformational leadership in various cultures. As a result, it has been observed that because of its charismatic and simulative characteristics, these leaders are more effective on developed countries and innovative characteristics rather than group oriented and depressed cultures.

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Section: Results Of Hofstede's Cultural Study About Iraqmentioning

confidence: 97%

Effectiveness of Transformational Leadership among Different Cultures

Poturak¹,

Mekić²,

Hadžiahmetović³

et al. 2020

IJSSES

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“…Compounding this was reluctance by the PUK and the KDP to institutionalize their military and security forces within the context of shared governance, preferring to maintain control over separately controlled and loyal forces (Kawa, 2015). Following the collapse of the Iraqi Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the KDP and PUK became militarily and financially stronger because of the support of Western partners like the US (Hama, 2019). Moreover, the collapse of the Kurdistan Region’s primary enemy allowed for an overnight change in the balance of power on the ground in northern Iraq and in Baghdad.…”

Section: The Crisis Of the Kurdistan Region’s Political System Before...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This new arrangement spurred an economic boost for the Region's economy, which was monopolized by the PUK and the KDP (Kawa, 2015). The newfound wealth allowed both parties to recruit additional people in their military and security wings, expanding them to more than twice their pre-2003 size (Hama, 2019a). As they gained in strength, the level of corruption in the Kurdistan Region also increased.…”

Section: Political Opposition In the Kurdistan Region Of Iraqmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This issue became evident when problems arose between the KDP and the Gorran Movement over the question of the law governing Iraqi Kurdistan's Presidency and the shape of the Region's political system. The KDP confronted the problem by using its security services to prevent the speaker of the Kurdistan parliament (a Gorran Movement politician) from entering Erbil, the capital city of the Kurdistan Region, which by consequence prevented the regional parliament from meeting and voting on the issue (Hama, 2019a).…”

Section: The Gorran Movement's Period Of Weaknessmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The rise and fall of movement for change in the Kurdistan region of Iraq (2009–2018)

Hama

2020

Asian Journal of Comparative Politics

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The Change Movement, also known in Kurdish as Gorran, was founded in 2009 to address the political demands of some parts of the public in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) for political and economic reform. Corruption, lack of transparency in government and financial affairs revenue and expenditure, the lack of legitimate and effective institutions, the existence of political party interference in all sectors of society, and the power-sharing agreement between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) had all contributed to widespread feelings of discontent among members of the public. Gorran took advantage of these feelings of disenfranchisement to demand a complete change in the political structure that had been built by the KDP and the PUK in the Region. Using this message, Gorran’s first election as an organized party in 2009 saw it become the second biggest political force in the Kurdistan Region and the biggest political party in the PUK’s traditional stronghold in Sulaymaniyah and the Garmian area. This research divides the Gorran Movement’s performance and effectiveness into three primary stages: (1) the opposition stage, which can be described as Gorran’s golden period; (2) the government participation stage after 2013, which can be described as the Movement’s period of weakness; and (3) the post-Nawshirwan Mustafa stage, which can be described as the Gorran Movement’s period of political exhaustion. The central argument of this research is that the Gorran Movement’s fundamental problem is that it became a part of the very structure that it had for many years campaigned against and is no longer a catalyst for reform.

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“…In October 2015, security forces loyal to the KDP prevented the Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament, Yusuf Muhammad from the Gorran Movement, from entering Erbil to preside over a session that may have curtailed Barzani's term in office. Following this incident, Gorran ministers were expelled from the government by the KDP, who proceeded to fill all the vacant ministerial posts with its own members (Hama, 2019b). Barzani decided to resign on November 2017 after the independence referendum championed by him backfired and triggered a regional crisis (Jalabi and Chmaytelli, 2017).…”

Section: Shared Characteristics Of the Political Parties: Charismatic Leadershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Parties and the Political System in Iraqi Kurdistan

Hama

Abdullah

2020

Journal of Asian and African Studies

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The Kurdistan Region of Iraq has a multi-party system which has been held up as a model for democratic pluralism in the whole region. The nature of Kurdistan’s political parties is strongly related to the position of Kurds in Iraq. From the mid-twentieth century, the dominant Kurdish political party in Iraq was the Kurdistan Democratic Party; in a later partisan split the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was born. Moreover, in the last three decades other political parties have come into being, which have all influenced the characteristics of Iraqi Kurdistan’s political system. This paper’s main argument is that Iraqi Kurdistan shares many of the characteristics of its main political parties, including reliance on charismatic leadership, a focus on nationalism, and the lack of transparency. This paper analyzes the primary characteristics of the Kurdish political parties and their influence on the institutional functions of the political system in the Kurdistan Region.

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The consequences of the fragmented military in Iraqi Kurdistan

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Effectiveness of Transformational Leadership among Different Cultures

Effectiveness of Transformational Leadership among Different Cultures

The rise and fall of movement for change in the Kurdistan region of Iraq (2009–2018)

Political Parties and the Political System in Iraqi Kurdistan

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