The Conspiracy Mentality Scale

Abstract

Abstract. Beliefs in conspiracy theories, generally considered to be a unidimensional construct, are associated with negative outcomes. The existing measures of conspiracy theory beliefs have number of shortcomings. We present the development of a novel measure of the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories and report the discovery of a second factor that reflects rational skepticism. In Study 1 ( N = 500) we use item response theory to devise the final items. In Study 2 ( N = 202) we demonstrate the predictive validity of the two factors for different types of conspiracies. In Study 3 ( N = 308) we demonstrate convergent/divergent validity. In Study 4 ( N = 800) we demonstrate construct validity in three countries. Implications for the concept of conspiracy theory and conspiracy theory beliefs are discussed.

Maybe a free thinker but not a critical one: High conspiracy belief is associated with low critical thinking ability

“…Sometimes, it is not unreasonable to think that a form of rationality would help to facilitate the detection of dangerous coalitions (van Prooijen & Van Vugt, 2018). In that respect, Stojanov and Halberstadt (2019) recently introduced a distinction between irrational versus rational suspicion. Although the former focuses on the general tendency to believe in any conspiracy theories, the later focus on higher sensitivity to deception or corruption, which is defined as "healthy skepticism.…”

“…These two aspects of suspicion can now be handled simultaneously thanks to a new scale developed by Stojanov and Halberstadt (2019).…”

“…Among the cognitive skills potentially associated with conspiracy belief, results point to the compatibility of certain forms of cognitive style with conspiratorial thinking. In accordance with the gullible conspiracist hypothesis, several studies (Adam-Troian et al, 2019;Barron et al, 2018;Georgiou et al, 2019;Ståhl & van Prooijen, 2018;Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2019;Swami et al, 2014;van der Wal et al, 2018;van Prooijen, 2017;Wagner-Egger et al, 2019) have pointed out that people who strongly believe in conspiracy theories show a low level of analytic thinking (characterized as being slow, controlled, and resource-demanding; Franssens & De Neys, 2009). Taking this further, eliciting analytic thinking through different procedures causally decreases conspiracy beliefs (Studies 2-4, Swami et al, 2014).…”

Mistrust and misinformation: A two-component, socio-epistemic model of belief in conspiracy theories

“…In contrast, epistemic mistrust can be much more focused on specific informational sources or institutions of epistemic authority including individual governments or political parties, scientific organizations, or corporations. This potentially narrow specificity of mistrust helps to account for the diversity of conspiracy theory themes and the fact that while belief in one conspiracy might predict belief in another, it does not predict belief in all others (Goertzel, 1994;Klein, Clutton, & Polito, 2018;Mancosu, Vassallo, & Vezzoni, 2017;Oliver & Wood, 2014aStojanov & Halberstadt, 2019).…”

“…Raab, Ortlieb, et al (2013, p. 2) have noted that existing conspiracy theory questionnaires may draw "an artificial red line between believers and nonbelievers" of conspiracy theories, whereas BCT actually represents a narrative with "thirty shades of truth." In keeping with this view, Stojanov and Halberstadt (2019) have recently developed a scale that captures both irrational "conspiracy theory ideation" (as measured by statements like "some things that everyone accepts as true are in fact hoaxes created by people in power") and rational "skepticism" (e.g. "some things are not as they seem") as separable components of BCT.…”