The “Constant” Threat to the Dispositional Essentialist Conception of Laws

Livanios, Vassilis

doi:10.1515/mp-2014-0009

Metaphysica

2014

DOI: 10.1515/mp-2014-0009

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The “Constant” Threat to the Dispositional Essentialist Conception of Laws

Vassilis Livanios

Abstract: According to the dispositional essentialist account of laws of nature, the latter express the dispositional nature of fundamental natural properties. In this paper I discuss the difficulty that the existence of fundamental constants of nature raises for that account. To this end, I examine a relevant argument against the account and describe how an advocate of the dispositionalist conception may try to undermine it by raising objections to its premises. Then I discuss those objections and show that eventually … Show more

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Cited by 2 publications

References 17 publications

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No laws and (thin) powers in, no (governing) laws out

2020

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Non-Humean accounts of the metaphysics of nature posit either laws or powers in order to account for natural necessity and world-order. We argue that such monistic views face fundamental problems. On the one hand, neo-Aristotelians cannot give unproblematic powerbased accounts of the functional laws among quantities offered by physical theories, as well as of the place of conservation laws and symmetries in a lawless ontology; in order to capture these characteristics, commitment to governing laws is indispensable. On the other hand, ontologies that entirely exclude some kind of power ascription to worldly entities (such as primitivism) face what we call the Governing Problem: such ontologies do not have the resources to give an adequate account of how laws play their governing role. We propose a novel dualist model, which, we argue, has the resources to solve the difficulties encountered by its two dominant competitors, without inheriting the problems of either view. According to the dualist model, both laws and powers (suitably conceived) are equally fundamental and irreducible to each other, and both are needed in order to give a satisfactory account of the nomological structure of the world. The dualist model constitutes thus a promising alternative to current monistic views in the metaphysics of science. 1 This tradition goes back to Descartes (1982). For a detailed account of this tradition and its relation to the earlier dominant Aristotelianism, see Psillos (2018). 2 We think, but will not argue for this now, that the origins of this dualist model can be found in Leibniz's mature (post 1680) work and especially in his critique of occasionalism, which posited laws but divested matter of all power. For some preliminary discussion, see Psillos (2018).

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No laws and (thin) powers in, no (governing) laws out

2020

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Fine-Tuned of Necessity?

Page¹

2018

Res Phil.

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This paper seeks to explicate and analyse an alternative response to fine-tuning arguments from those that are typically given, namely, design or brute contingency. The response I explore is based on necessity, the necessitarian response. After showing how necessity blocks the argument, I explicate the reply I claim necessitarians can give, and suggest how its three requirements can be met. Firstly that laws are metaphysically necessary, secondly that constants are metaphysically necessary, and thirdly that the fundamental properties which determine the laws and constants are necessary. After discussing each in turn, I end the paper by assessing how the response fares when running the fine-tuning argument in two ways, as an inference to best explanation and as a Bayesian argument. Fine-tuning arguments for theism generally run as follows. 2 First, we are told that in order for life to exist, very precise laws of nature, constants of nature, and initial conditions are required, 3 without which life would be impossible. 4 Advocates then contend that design is the best explanation or most likely hypothesis for these requirements being met as opposed to alternatives. Collins, the most prominent contemporary advocate, canvasses one alternative, brute contingency, where this answer takes two forms, either a "naturalistic single-universe hypothesis … the existence of which is an unexplained, brute given", or the "naturalistic multiverse hypothesis" (2009, 204). 5 I would like to avoid brute contingency responses to the 6 The necessitarian response could also come in a multi-verse variety, and this may cause distinct problems for the argument not addressed here since I focus on a single-universe account. 7 They are therefore necessary in a de re rather than de dicto sense. 8 Oppy (2013a; 2013b) thinks a similar move can be made against certain cosmological arguments, see Leftow (2017) for a reply; some of the comments made by Leftow would also be applicable to the necessitarian picture examined in this paper. 9 Namely the necessity of the initial quantity and place of properties.

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The “Constant” Threat to the Dispositional Essentialist Conception of Laws

Cited by 2 publications

References 17 publications

No laws and (thin) powers in, no (governing) laws out

No laws and (thin) powers in, no (governing) laws out

Fine-Tuned of Necessity?

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