2021
DOI: 10.1163/9789004459151
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The Constitutional Framework for Enhanced Cooperation in EU Law

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Cited by 12 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…De Witte refers to the Article 136.1 eurozone procedure and the permanent structured cooperation as 'two policy-specific mechanisms of enhanced cooperation', 32 closer cooperation mechanisms'. 33 However, for other scholars, such as Miglio, they constitute distinct procedures, whereby only the Article 82-83 TfEU and Article 86-87 TfEU fast-track procedure in criminal law can be explicitly traced back to enhanced cooperation. 34 In this paper I will argue that special regimes are connected to the Article 20 TEU procedure, yet they expand the range of closer cooperation mechanisms within EU primary law beyond it.…”
Section: Special Regimes Of Enhanced Cooperation: What Why and When?mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…De Witte refers to the Article 136.1 eurozone procedure and the permanent structured cooperation as 'two policy-specific mechanisms of enhanced cooperation', 32 closer cooperation mechanisms'. 33 However, for other scholars, such as Miglio, they constitute distinct procedures, whereby only the Article 82-83 TfEU and Article 86-87 TfEU fast-track procedure in criminal law can be explicitly traced back to enhanced cooperation. 34 In this paper I will argue that special regimes are connected to the Article 20 TEU procedure, yet they expand the range of closer cooperation mechanisms within EU primary law beyond it.…”
Section: Special Regimes Of Enhanced Cooperation: What Why and When?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Currently, after Denmark joined in May 2023 following the abolishment of its opt-out from defence policies, 26 Member States take part into the cooperation (with Malta remaining the only non-participating Member State), 58 but subgroups of Member States participate in different projects under the coordination of the Council. 59 Since the project's governance is defined by the Council Decision 2017/2315, large flexibility is left to the Member States that join the projects. In fact, Blockmans noted that PESCO so far represents the most 'inclusive' form of closer cooperation, as almost all Member States are part of it.…”
Section: Permanent Structured Cooperation In the Field Of Defencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, DI can affect the position of non-participating Member States, such as when erga omnes effects of the Court's jurisprudence in differentiated settings breach their rights. 48 In this context, the question can be asked whether there are substantial limits to DI, such as in the domain of fundamental rights. 49 Indeed, the British and Polish special Protocol on the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter) 50 has given rise to several concerns, although the Court has recognized that it does not amount to a real opt-out, and it 'does not call into question the applicability of the Charter in the United Kingdom or in Poland' 51 .…”
Section: Legal Accountabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%