2005
DOI: 10.1093/bybil/75.1.101
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The constitutive Versus the Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?

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Cited by 18 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…From this point of view, fulfilling the conditions for statehood alone does not suffice to render an entity a subject of international law, thus leaving the non-recognized State without rights and obligations vis-à-vis the non-recognizing States; in other words, international law does not apply between them. 30 The predominant view is the one that considers that state recognition just "establishes, confirms or provides evidence of the objective legal situation". 31 Therefore "the international legal personality of a State and its concomitant rights and obligations solely depend on it being able to satisfy the criteria for statehood".…”
Section: Recognition Of States and The Contravention Of Ius Cogens Rulesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…From this point of view, fulfilling the conditions for statehood alone does not suffice to render an entity a subject of international law, thus leaving the non-recognized State without rights and obligations vis-à-vis the non-recognizing States; in other words, international law does not apply between them. 30 The predominant view is the one that considers that state recognition just "establishes, confirms or provides evidence of the objective legal situation". 31 Therefore "the international legal personality of a State and its concomitant rights and obligations solely depend on it being able to satisfy the criteria for statehood".…”
Section: Recognition Of States and The Contravention Of Ius Cogens Rulesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…76 Statehood does indeed bestow upon states a certain set of 'rudimentary' rights, ie rights the states inherently possess merely by virtue of being states. 77 These include the right of a state to political independence, including the right to choose any political, economic, social, and cultural system, the right to exercise jurisdiction, ie to organise itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and so forth, as well as certain other rights regarding participation in customary…”
Section: An Essential and Irreducible Freedom From Economic Coercion?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Gerek izhari gerekse yapıcı kurama dair kapsamlı bilgi için bakınız:Lauterpacht (1944);Talmon (2005).…”
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