The Continuing Relevance of Family Income for Religious Participation: U.S. White Catholic Church Attendance in the Late 20th Century

Schwadel, Philip; McCarthy, John; Nelsen, Hart M.

doi:10.1353/sof.0.0220

Cited by 28 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 68 publications

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“…Thus, moderately educated Americans may feel less attracted to churches that uphold the bourgeois virtues—delayed gratification, a focus on education, self-control, etc.—that undergird this lifestyle. As importantly, working class whites may also feel uncomfortable socializing with the middle and upper class whites who have increasingly come to dominate the life of religious congregations in the U.S. since the 1970s (Schwadel, McCarthy, & Nelsen, 2009), especially as they see their own economic fortunes fall. In brief, the declining economic position of white working class Americans may have made the bourgeois moral logic embodied in many churches both less attractive and attainable.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We focus on whites because black and Latino religiosity is less likely to be stratified by class, given that churches have been an important vehicle for solidarity, community action, and political activity for blacks and Latinos of varying class backgrounds (Ellison & Sherkat, 1995; Lincoln & Mamiya, 1990; Figueroa Deck, 1989; Schwadel, McCarthy, & Nelsen, 2009). We focus on the working class—defined here as “moderately educated” Americans who have a high school degree or some college education but not a 4-year bachelor’s degree—because what little research that has been done recently on religion and stratification has focused primarily on how lower-class Catholics are less likely to attend church, compared to their middle-class and more affluent fellow believers (Schwadel, McCarthy, & Nelsen 2009), and has not considered the possibility that patterns of working class religiosity may now be diverging from those found among their more educated and affluent peers. According to GSS data, however, moderately educated whites make up 60 percent of the adult white population (aged 25–44) in the contemporary United States.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Thus, if moderately educated whites are now less likely to be stably employed, to earn a decent income, to be married with children, and to hold familistic views, they may also be less likely to feel comfortable or interested in regularly attending churches that continue to uphold conventional norms, either implicitly or explicitly (Edgell, 2006; Wilcox, 2004). We also view the institutions of work and marriage as important sources of social and normative integration that link Americans to religious institutions (Schwadel, McCarthy, & Nelsen, 2009). For these reasons, this paper relies on the GSS and NSFG to explore the links between declines in working class religiosity and patterns of employment, income, family structure, sexual behavior, and attitudes toward premarital sex.…”

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confidence: 99%

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No Money, No Honey, No Church: The Deinstitutionalization of Religious Life Among the White Working Class

Wilcox¹,

Cherlin²,

Uecker³

et al. 2012

Religion, Work and Inequality

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Purpose We examine trends in religious attendance by educational group, with an emphasis on the “moderately educated:” individuals with a high-school degree but not a 4-year college degree. Methodology We conduct multivariate ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression models using data from the General Social Survey (from 1972 to 2010) and the National Survey of Family Growth (from 1982 to 2008). Findings We find that religious attendance among moderately educated whites has declined relative to attendance among college-educated whites. Economic characteristics, current and past family characteristics, and attitudes toward premarital sex each explain part of this differential decline. Implications Religion is becoming increasingly deinstitutionalized among whites with moderate levels of education, which suggests further social marginalization of this group. Furthermore, trends in the labor force, American family life, and attitudes appear to have salient ramifications for organized religion. Sociologists of religion need to once again attend to social stratification in religious life.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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No Money, No Honey, No Church: The Deinstitutionalization of Religious Life Among the White Working Class

Wilcox¹,

Cherlin²,

Uecker³

et al. 2012

Religion, Work and Inequality

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show abstract

“…This finding is somewhat unexpected because previous research has shown that size is related to socioeconomic status (SES) (Eagle 2012) and SES is related to attendance (Schwadel, McCarthy, and Nelsen 2009). However, given these results, it appears that the size-attendance and SESattendance relationships are independent from one another.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 76%

The Negative Relationship between Size and the Probability of Weekly Attendance in Churches in the United States

Eagle

2016

Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World

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Are people less likely to attend large churches? Using nationally representative data, I find a negative relationship between size and the probability of attendance for Conservative, Mainline, and black Protestants and for Catholics in parishes larger than 500 attenders. The addition of control variables does not change these patterns. These results support the theory that group cohesion lies at the heart of the size-participation relationship in churches. With the rapid growth of megachurches in the United States, a negative relationship between size and frequency of attendance could serve to accelerate aggregate declines in attendance. Methodologically, this article demonstrates how Bayesian hierarchical models can handle complex data structures and imputation procedures in a unified model.

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“…Die Ergebnisse deuten zumindest für die Kirchgangshäufigkeit darauf hin, dass zwei parallele zeitliche Wandlungsprozesse zu beobachten sind: ein intergenerationaler Wandel ("cohort replacement"), d. h. eine Abnahme der Kirchgangshäufigkeit im Vergleich zwischen verschiedenen Geburtskohorten (Säkularisierung) und gleichzeitig ein intrapersonaler Wandel, der sich in einem positiven Alterseffekt auf die religiöse Partizipation äußert (Firebaugh und Harley 1991;Miller und nakamura 1996;Schwadel et al 2009). Die genannten Studien basieren allerdings jeweils auf Trenddaten und sind daher nur begrenzt geeignet, um Veränderungen innerhalb von Personen über die Zeit zu analysieren.…”

Section: Bisherige Forschungsbefunde Zu Lebenszyklischen Veränderungeunclassified

Wie verändert sich die Religiosität im Lebensverlauf?

Lois

2011

Köln Z Soziol

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Zusammenfassung: der beitrag untersucht mit daten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels und Fixed-Effects-Regressionsmodellen die Veränderung der Kirchgangshäufigkeit im Lebensverlauf. Im Zeitraum 1992-2007 ist altersübergreifend ein leichter Rückgang zu beobachten. Dieser im Sinne einer Säkularisierung interpretierbare Periodeneffekt wird durch einen positiven Alterseffekt konterkariert. Der positive Einfluss des Lebensalters schwächt sich jedoch mit fortlaufender Kalenderzeit tendenziell ab. Dies kann ebenfalls als eine Form von Säkularisierung interpretiert werden. Vertiefende Analysen zeigen, dass der Übergang in den Ruhestand sowie in Westdeutschland die erste Eheschließung, Kinder im Schulalter und eine Verwitwung, jeweils zu einem Anstieg der Kirchgangshäufigkeit beitragen und den positiven Alterseffekt somit teilweise vermitteln. Eine Erhöhung des individuellen Bildungsniveaus und Erwerbsumfangs, die erste Scheidung (in Westdeutschland) und der Übergang in eine nichteheliche Lebensgemeinschaft (in Ostdeutschland) wirken dem positiven Alterseffekt jedoch entgegen und verstärken somit den altersübergreifenden Säkularisierungstrend. Schlüsselwörter: Religiosität · Kirchgangshäufigkeit · Lebensverlauf · Familienzyklus · SäkularisierungAbstract: Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and fixed-effects regression models, this paper examines church attendance rates across the life course. For 1992-2007, the overall frequency of churchgoing shows a slight decrease (secularization). This period effect is continuously thwarted by a positive age effect. However, this positive age effect becomes weaker over the recent years which also might be interpreted as a kind of secularization. In-depth analyses show that, in West Germany, the age-specific increase of church attendance rates is paralleled by gradual increases in the frequency of churchgoing after transition into first marriage, when children reach school-age and after the transition to widowhood. However, reaching a higher

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The Continuing Relevance of Family Income for Religious Participation: U.S. White Catholic Church Attendance in the Late 20th Century

Cited by 28 publications

References 68 publications

No Money, No Honey, No Church: The Deinstitutionalization of Religious Life Among the White Working Class

No Money, No Honey, No Church: The Deinstitutionalization of Religious Life Among the White Working Class

The Negative Relationship between Size and the Probability of Weekly Attendance in Churches in the United States

Wie verändert sich die Religiosität im Lebensverlauf?

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