The control of export credit subsidies and its welfare consequences

Carmichael, Calum

doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(87)80002-8

Cited by 77 publications

(56 citation statements)

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“…Consider, then, a developing country government that would like to o¤er a production subsidy to …rms that invest in a new import-competing industry (i.e., it would like to distort the production margin), but cannot feasibly raise the funds for the production subsidy by independent means and so employs an import tari¤ in the industry instead (which 25 The commitment role for trade agreements has been formalized in a large number of papers. In addition to the papers I discuss below, see Carmichael (1987), Staiger and Tabellini (1987), Matsuyama (1990) and Rodriguez-Clare (1998, 2007), to name a few. distorts both the production margin and the consumption margin).…”

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confidence: 99%

Non-Tariff Measures and the WTO

Staiger

2012

SSRN Journal

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In this paper I sketch out the rough contours of the challenge faced by the WTO in dealing with non-tari¤ measures (NTMs) as seen from the economic theories of trade agreements. The key questions for the WTO -the answers to which largely dictate the choice between shallow and deep approaches to integration -appear to be two: (1) Is it the terms-of-trade problem or the commitment problem that WTO member governments seek to solve with their WTO membership?; and (2) Is it market clearing or o¤shoring/bilateral bargaining that is now the most prominent mechanism for the determination of international prices? I suggest that evidence on the …rst question points to the terms-of-trade theory and hence toward shallow integration, but that answering the second question may be the key to identifying the best way forward on NTMs for the WTO. Along the way I provide a terms-of-trade interpretation of the WTO's Trade Facilitation Agreement. JEL: D62, F13, F55, H21 and H23.

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Non-Tariff Measures and the WTO

Staiger

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…In a many period economy, even if the government acts first in each period, the firms' current investment precedes the government's future subsidy unless the government can commit to a path of subsidies once and for all in the initiai period. A government that cannot ' Even in such models that ignore investment, however, the optimal policy depends criticaily on the specification of the game (Krugman, 1984;Eaton and Grossman, 1986;Carmichaei, 1987;Cheng, 1987Cheng, , 1988Gruenspecht, 1988: Markusen andVenables, 1988;de Meza. 1989;and Neary, 1989).…”

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The failure of strategic industrial policies due to manipulation by firms

Karp¹,

Perloff²

1995

International Review of Economics & Finance

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“…Ž . Carmichael 1987 andGruenspecht 1988 have used an alternative model where firms seeking export credit support can commit to their price before the govern-Ž . ment in their models the USA's EximBank sets the terms of the export credit.…”

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confidence: 99%

Intervention in risky export markets: insurance, strategic action or aid?

Dewit

2001

European Journal of Political Economy

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Because the use of trade policy is limited by international institutional arrangements, governments pursuing a policy of export promotion may want to use more indirect instruments to achieve their objectives. In that context, this paper focuses on the public provision of export insurance. While the prime objective is insurance against the risk of default faced by firms exporting to risky markets, these insurance programmes are often embedded in more global policy objectives of the exporting country's government. This paper investigates how premium rating of official export insurance is affected by strategic export promotion and the pursuit of other political objectives. q 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.JEL classification: D81; F13

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The control of export credit subsidies and its welfare consequences

Cited by 77 publications

References 4 publications

Non-Tariff Measures and the WTO

Non-Tariff Measures and the WTO

The failure of strategic industrial policies due to manipulation by firms

Intervention in risky export markets: insurance, strategic action or aid?

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