The correctness and relevance of the modal ontological argument

Abstract

This paper deals with some metaphilosophical aspects of the modal ontological argument originating from Charles Hartshorne. One of the specific premises of the argument expresses the idea that the existence of God is not contingent. Several well-known versions of the argument have been formulated that appeal to different ways of clarifying the latter. A question arises: which of the formally correct and relevant versions is proper or basic? The paper points to some criteria of formal correctness, and distinguishes two types of relevance for these versions: strong and weak. Its aim is to furnish a strictly worked out answer to the question, taking into account each of these types. As a result, a very simple, formally correct and (weakly) relevant version of the modal ontological argument is formulated. The results obtained are also used to criticize a popular belief about the relations in which the main versions of the modal ontological argument stand to one another.

Modal Ontological Arguments

“…Additionally, as Andrzej Biłat (2021) shows, the comparatively weaker logical system T – which merely adds the assumption that □A→A to the weak logic K ‐‐ yields a valid MOA which features only the premises that (i) God's existence is either necessary or impossible and (ii) God's existence is possible. Marco Hausmann (2022) develops an ontological argument for the actual – but not, necessary ‐‐ existence of God which assumes the truth of neither S5 nor (i).…”