The cost of coalition compromise: The electoral effects of holding salient portfolios

Abstract

This article highlights the electoral effects of holding salient portfolios within a coalition government. For voters, holding ministries can be seen as a symbol of a party’s success within the coalition. As a voting heuristic, parties not controlling the portfolios on issues important to their platforms signal their failure to achieve these goals. Following this perspective, we hypothesize that the difference between coalition parties that hold salient portfolios and those that do not partially predicts the extent of the electoral cost of coalition participation. Using a data set that covers 11 European parliamentary democracies between 1966 and 2002, we show that for junior coalition partners there is an electoral reward for holding their most salient portfolio. There is also an electoral benefit for a junior partner to hold a larger number of portfolios if they do not control their most salient portfolio. Conversely, holding their most salient portfolio and a larger number of additional ministries results in greater electoral losses in the subsequent parliamentary election. These results indicate that parties’ success at negotiating for their policy priorities in coalition governments holds consequences for their future electoral success.

Do party supporters accept policy compromises in coalition governments?

“…We also need a better understanding of the breaking point after which supporters punish their parties for compromising as well as what party supporters care about the most. Following part of the existing literature (e.g., Debus & Müller 2014), our paper has focused on policies and policy payoffs during coalition talks, but it is possible for voters to additionally care (or even more so) about other bargaining outcomes, such as portfolio allocation (see Greene et al 2020). Given the central role of ministerial portfolios, if voters understand specific party responsibilities within the coalition -and there is some evidence that they do (Duch et al 2015) -voters should want their party to gain control of more salient portfolios.…”

“…Following part of the existing literature (e.g., Debus & Müller 2014), our paper has focused on policies and policy payoffs during coalition talks, but it is possible for voters to additionally care (or even more so) about other bargaining outcomes, such as portfolio allocation (see Greene et al. 2020). Given the central role of ministerial portfolios, if voters understand specific party responsibilities within the coalition – and there is some evidence that they do (Duch et al.…”

“…In this paper, we focus on the expected policy payoffs during coalition talks(Debus and Müller 2014). Voters may also focus on other bargaining outcomes, such as the allocation of ministerial portfolios (seeGreene, Henceroth and Jensen 2020). We discuss this additional possibility in the concluding section below.…”

“…Voters may also focus on other bargaining outcomes, such as the allocation of ministerial portfolios (see Greene et al. 2020). We discuss this additional possibility in the concluding section below.…”

Voters’ short-term responsiveness to coalition deals

“…The paper opens up many interesting avenues of research. For instance, it is worth considering not only how much parties move away from previously held ideological positions but also how much they are successful in terms of election pledges or portfolio allocation (see Greene et al, 2020 ). And how lasting the effects of such coalition deals are.…”