2008
DOI: 10.1080/17440570802254338
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The cost of protection racket in Sicily

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Cited by 34 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…Organised crime is a unique and specific problem 5 of those Southern regions, and its several negative effects on the regular economic activities have been recently studied. In fact, according to several authors (Asmundo and Lisciandra, 2008;Asso and Trigilia, 2011;Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2009), it creates direct and indirect costs for regular firms, such as extortion and constraints in recruiting workers and in applying for public tender contracts (for example, in the building sector). Moreover, by using their criminal power to protect their own 'legal' economic activities, criminal organisations discourage other firms from competing with them (and, therefore, their own firms can therefore operate as monopolies); and, by using illegal financial resources to lower their costs, 'legal' firms under their control can be unfairly competitive on the free market.…”
Section: The Explanatory Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Organised crime is a unique and specific problem 5 of those Southern regions, and its several negative effects on the regular economic activities have been recently studied. In fact, according to several authors (Asmundo and Lisciandra, 2008;Asso and Trigilia, 2011;Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2009), it creates direct and indirect costs for regular firms, such as extortion and constraints in recruiting workers and in applying for public tender contracts (for example, in the building sector). Moreover, by using their criminal power to protect their own 'legal' economic activities, criminal organisations discourage other firms from competing with them (and, therefore, their own firms can therefore operate as monopolies); and, by using illegal financial resources to lower their costs, 'legal' firms under their control can be unfairly competitive on the free market.…”
Section: The Explanatory Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In fact, these rent‐extraction activities—specifically extortions—are the type of crimes that occur at a local level where there is territorial control by an organized crime group. According to Asmundo and Lisciandra (), the majority of the cases studied for their research involved the typical form of extortion consisting in a regular fee or payment demanded or imposed by the criminal organization to legal businesses through intimidation and threats of violence—that is, damage in property or in person. Some studies on the economic literature of crime (see e.g., Calderoni ; Lavezzi ; Lisciandra ) explain that, in order to extract such contributions, organized crime demands the payment of various fees, depending on the productive sectors’ profitability.…”
Section: Economic Overview Of Michoacánmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some studies on the economic literature of crime (see e.g., Calderoni ; Lavezzi ; Lisciandra ) explain that, in order to extract such contributions, organized crime demands the payment of various fees, depending on the productive sectors’ profitability. But one of the most relevant traits by which businesses in the legal productive sectors are selected by organized crime is because, according to Asmundo and Lisciandra (), they represent the most prosperous businesses in the region and because their revenues are easily monitored so the criminal organization can demand a suitable extortion sum. The modus operandi in the case of avocado producers differs from the one used by the KT in the case of lime producers, and it is also different from the one implemented in the case of iron production exports.…”
Section: Economic Overview Of Michoacánmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, Rey cannot estimate the cost of brutal crime, such as murder and sex assault, because no transfer of money is involved. Asmundo and Lisciandra (2008) try to estimate the average and total social costs of protection racket in Sicily (Italy), using regional data. They consider the amounts paid for the criminal protection, what they call "costs as a consequence", but they leave out other significant expenditures, such as costs in anticipation and costs in response to crime.…”
Section: Previous Studiesmentioning
confidence: 99%