The costs of interest representation – a resource perspective on informational lobbying

Abstract

While expert information and information on public preferences are seen as key resources that interest groups provide to policymakers, little is known about the resources that are necessary to acquire such information. Existing scholarship argues that financial resources enhance a group’s ability to supply information, which could be problematic as it suggests that resource poor groups are disadvantaged when lobbying policymakers. Applying a resource perspective to informational lobbying, this paper argues that different information types require different resources and that financial means are less important than assumed. The predictions are tested using a new dataset and survey of 383 advocates active on 50 specific policy issues in five West European countries. The results show that while economic resources are indeed associated with a higher amount of expert information, political capacities allow a group to provide both expert information and information on public preferences. This suggests that groups can rely on other than economic resources for information provision.

Prioritizing professionals? How the democratic and professionalized nature of interest groups shapes their degree of access to EU officials

“…Member involvement relates to those organizational features that are aimed at connecting, engaging, and interacting with members, while ensuring that the group reflects members' preferences and information. This organizational dimension speaks to the idea of representation capacity, defined as the ability of groups to speak on behalf of their members (Flöthe, 2019b). Groups that intend to foster their intermediate role are expected to have organizational mechanisms that connect them with their membership base.…”

Informational demand across the globe: toward a comparative understanding of information exchange

“…The information-exchange perspective is among the most frequently used theoretical approaches in interest group scholarship. Most studies to date have addressed the supply side of interest groups in information exchanges with decision-makers (see for instance Flöthe, 2019a;Tallberg et al, 2018;Klüver, 2013;Chalmers, 2013;De Bruycker, 2016). Our paper has contributed to this literature by focusing on the decision-makers' side of information exchanges and seeking to explain variation in the information demands of decision-makers across the globe in their exchanges with interest groups and INGOs.…”

“…Producing technical information is however a costly and time-consuming endeavor. Indeed, comparative research has shown that mostly wealthy interest organizations are able to supply technical information (Flöthe, 2019a). Hence, we can presume that the supply of technical information by interest groups is less secure in developing countries where societal interests are deprived and lack the financial capabilities to produce and communicate technical expertise.…”

“…About the former, expertise-based information demands are characterized by the need for highly technical and scientific expertise, which is more likely provided by highly specialized and resourceful interest organizations (Flöthe, 2019a). Previous research showed that while business groups and civil society organizations provide technical input to a similar extent, poor or understaffed groups are less likely to comply with the expertise-based demands of policymakers (De Bruycker, 2016;Flöthe, 2019a). Demands for technical information thus foster and reproduce biases in favor of wealthy interest organizations.…”

“…The information-exchange perspective on lobbying has become an important model in interest group and international non-governmental organization (INGO) scholarship. This perspective suggests that information is a crucial commodity in lobbying processes (Bloodgood, 2011;Flöthe, 2019aFlöthe, , 2019bKlüver, 2012;Schnakenberg, 2017;Stroup and Murdie, 2012). As such, interest organizations 1 provide expertise to time-pressured and understaffed decision-makers in the hope of gaining access or influence in return (Bouwen, 2002;Klüver, 2012).…”