The Counterfactual Conception of Compensation

Roberts, Rodney C.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2006.00451.x

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…This counterfactual account of compensation has been criticized by others, though. See especially Roberts [2006].…”

Section: Compensating By Refraining From Harmingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Defensive Wars and the Reprisal Dilemma

Bazargan

2014

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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I address a foundational problem with accounts of the morality of war that are derived from the Just War Tradition (JWT). Such accounts problematically focus on 'the moment of crisis': i.e. when a state is considering a resort to war. This is problematic because sometimes the state considering the resort to war is partly responsible for wrongly creating the conditions in which the resort to war becomes necessary. By ignoring this possibility, JWT effectively ignores, in its moral evaluation of wars, certain types of past wrongdoing. I argue that we can address this problem by incorporating an account of compensatory liability into an account of the morality of war. Doing so yields the view that, if we have culpably failed to compensate victims for past wrongs, we might be morally required to weigh the well-being of those victims more heavily in our calculation of proportionality when determining the permissibility of a defensive act that harms the victim as a side-effect. This, in turn, makes satisfying the proportionality constraint more difficult. The upshot is that sometimes, in order to wage a defensive war permissibly, we first have to discharge compensatory duties. This has implications for how we evaluate 'cycles of reprisals' that plague warfare.

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“…This counterfactual account of compensation has been criticized by others, though. See especially Roberts [2006].…”

Section: Compensating By Refraining From Harmingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Defensive Wars and the Reprisal Dilemma

Bazargan

2014

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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“…This focus on more recent harms, which do not require us to go all the way back to slavery, presumes that comparisons between the actual circumstances of black people and counterfactual circumstances are much less difficult. But even ardent supports of black reparations have been critical of such counterfactual reasoning in reparations arguments (Roberts 2006).…”

Section: Reparations For Racial Inequalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Reparations and Racial Inequality

Darby

2010

Philosophy Compass

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A recent development in philosophical scholarship on reparations for black chattel slavery and Jim Crow segregation is reliance upon social science in normative arguments for reparations. Although there are certainly positive things to be said in favor of an empirically informed normative argument for black reparations, given the depth of empirical disagreement about the causes of persistent racial inequalities, and the ethos of ‘post‐racial’ America, the strongest normative argument for reparations may be one that goes through irrespective of how we ultimately explain the causes of racial inequalities. By illuminating the interplay between normative political philosophy and social scientific explanations of racial inequality in the prevailing corrective justice argument for black reparations, I shall explain why an alternative normative argument, which is not tethered to a particular empirical explanation of racial inequality, may be more appealing.

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“…For a critique of the counterfactual conception, seeRoberts (2006).22 On the last clause, see note 18 above. 23 See especially pp.…”

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confidence: 99%

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2008

JESP

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David Alm WO GENERALLY RECOGNIZED moral duties are to reciprocate benefits one has received from others and to compensate harms one has done to others. In this paper I want to show that it is not possible to give an adequate account of either duty-or at least one that corresponds to our actual practices-within a contractualist moral theory of the type developed by T. M. Scanlon (1982, 1998). This fact is interesting in its own right, as contractualism is a leading contemporary contender among deontological moral theories, and the two duties I have mentioned are fairly standard ingredients of such theories. 1 But it also serves to highlight a general problem with contractualism, at least in Scanlon's version-namely its one-dimensional view of the keystone of any plausible deontological theory: the idea of respect for persons.

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The Counterfactual Conception of Compensation

Cited by 8 publications

References 12 publications

Defensive Wars and the Reprisal Dilemma

Defensive Wars and the Reprisal Dilemma

Reparations and Racial Inequality

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