The COVID‐19–Social Identity–Digital Media Nexus in India: Polarization and Blame

Abstract

Drawing on social identity theory and research on digital media and polarization, this study uses a quasi‐experimental design with a random sample (n = 3304) to provide causal evidence on perceptions of who is to blame for the initial spread of COVID‐19 in India. According blame to three different social and political entities—Tablighi Jamaat (a Muslim group), the Modi government, and migrant workers (a heterogeneous group)—are the dependent variables in three OLS regression models testing the effect of the no‐blame treatment, controlling for Facebook use, social identity (religion), vote in the 2019 national election, and other demographics. Results show respondents in the treatment group were more likely to allay blame, affective polarization (dislike for outgroup members) was social identity based, not partisan based, and Facebook/Instagram use was not significant. Congress and United Progressive Alliance voters in 2019 were less likely to blame the Modi government for the initial spread. Unlike extant research in western contexts, affective and political polarization appear to be distinct concepts in India where social identity complexity is important. This study of the first wave informs perceptions of blame in future waves, which are discussed in conclusion along with questions for future research.

Rapid Sharing of Islamophobic Hate on Facebook: The Case of the Tablighi Jamaat Controversy

“…One look at various social media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, and YouTube, is enough to attest to the changing nature of Indian society (from a liberal democracy to an ethnic democracy). BJP has its so-called IT cell, which runs all kinds of propaganda on social media (Jose, 2021; Mahapatra & Plagemann, 2019; Neyazi, 2020), and The Tablighi Jamaat incident during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic provided the supporters of the Hindutva (anti-Muslim) group to further polarize the country by spreading online hatred using the tools of misinformation (Arabaghatta Basavaraj et al, 2021). Some examples of representation of Muslims during TJC are shown in Figure 1.…”

Online polarization and identity politics: An analysis of Facebook discourse on Muslim and LGBTQ+ communities in Finland

“…It motivates individuals to evaluate their in‐groups more positively than out‐groups, providing them with feelings of self‐worth and pride. Recent research highlights the significance of social comparison in comprehending intergroup conflict and cooperation, such as political tolerance toward Muslims among young people (Noll et al, 2010), Muslim communities in the context of political party affiliations (Everett et al, 2015), blaming initial transmission of the COVID‐19 (Arabaghatta Basavaraj et al, 2021), the disparity in anti‐Muslim sentiment between East and West Germany (Kalter & Foroutan, 2021), election campaigns constructing Muslim immigrants as a “threat” to the nation (Doerr, 2021) and the impact of religious identity on polarization on social media discussions (Grigoropoulou, 2020).…”

El papel de los medios de comunicación en contextos de polarización afectiva: una revisión sistemática de la literatura

“…En los espacios más homogéneos de los medios sociales se han normalizado algunos discursos de odio en contextos políticos con conflictos crónicos, como es el caso del palestino-israelí (Harel et al, 2020), la toxicidad contra el feminismo (Suarez Estrada et al, 2022) o la tendencia a culpar al adversario político y a determinados grupos sociales del Covid-19 y sus efectos (Arabaghatta Basavaraj et al, 2021;Schmid et al, 2023). En este último sentido, cuando los medios partidistas 'imprimen' la identidad nacional en sus audiencias, contribuyen a generar una sensación de amenaza de grupo frente a quienes no se exponen a esta 'imprimación', teniendo como caso de estudio las oleadas de inmigración irregular de Centro América a los EE.…”