The ?crowding-out? effect of governmental transfers on private charitable contributions

Abrams, Burton A.; Schitz, Mark D.

doi:10.1007/bf00123940

Cited by 259 publications

(134 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Alternately, there are a few papers such as Brooks [2002] and Abrams and Schmitz [1984] that look at how welfare spending affects philanthropic behavior. This paper hopes to serve as a bridge between these two areas of research by using the welfare law's unique implications for non-citizens as a way to generate robust estimates of welfare's effects on philanthropic behavior.…”

Section: Iic Welfarementioning

confidence: 99%

Are church and state substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 welfare reform

Hungerman

2005

Journal of Public Economics

166

118

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Churches provide community services similar to those provided by the government, but there has been no convincing analysis of the extent to which church activity can substitute for government activity. To address this important issue, this paper uses a new panel data set of Presbyterian Church (USA) congregations to regress both church-member donations and a church's community spending on a number of variables, including government welfare expenditures. A provision of the 1996 welfare law that decreased the availability and use of welfare services by non-citizens serves as an instrument to identify the causal effect of government spending on church activity. The results show that church activities substitute for government activities. Extrapolating the findings to all denominations, the estimated "crowd-out" effect lies between twenty and thirty-eight cents on the dollar. The results are subjected to a number of robustness tests.

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Section: Iic Welfarementioning

confidence: 99%

Are church and state substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 welfare reform

Hungerman

2005

Journal of Public Economics

166

118

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“…For example, models of pure altruism imply full "crowding out" of both voluntary contributions and subsidies (Warr, 1982;Roberts, 1984;Bernheim, 1986;Andreoni, 1988a), although there is little evidence of crowding out empirically (Abrams and Schitz, 1978;Clotfelter, 1985) or experimentally (Andreoni, 1993). Models of altruism explaining bequests and inter-vivos transfers have similarly found little support in the data (e.g.…”

Section: B Altruism Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity: Evidence from linear public goods games

Croson¹

1998

PsycEXTRA Dataset

161

149

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Theories of commitment, altruism, and reciprocity have been invoked to explain and describe behavior in public goods and social dilemma situations. Commitment has been used to explain behaviors like water conservation and voting. Altruism has been applied to explain contributions to charities and intergenerational transfers and bequests. Reciprocity has been invoked to explain gift exchange and labor market decisions. This paper describes a set of experiments, which distinguish between these competing theories by testing their comparative statics predictions in a linear public goods setting. Results provide strong support for reciprocity theories over either theories of commitment or of altruism. DisciplinesOther Economics | Other Sociology | Theory, Knowledge and Science This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers/60 Theories of Commitment, Altruism and Reciprocity: Evidence from Linear Public Goods GamesRachel T.A. Croson CrosonR@opim.wharton.upenn.edu April, 1998 Abstract Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity have all been invoked to explain and describe observed behavior in public goods and social dilemma situations. In particular, commitment theories have been used to explain behaviors like water conservation and voting. Theories of altruism are applied in explanation of contributions to charities and intergenerational transfers and bequests. And theories of reciprocity have been invoked to explain gift exchange and labor market decisions. This paper describes a set of experiments which distinguish between these competing theories by testing their comparative statics predictions in a linear public goods setting. Results provide strong support for reciprocity theories over either theories of commitment or of altruism.

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“…This implies that the aggregate donation G is increasing whereas x i , g i , and b remain constant for all individuals. However, in this situation the contributing types have an 15 Abrams and Schmitz (1984) provide evidence that the number of potential recipients has a positive effect on charitable giving. This result suggests that other preferences than in (9) are relevant from an empirical point of view.…”

Section: Proposition 2: (A) If the Marginal Rates Of Substitutionmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Altruism and Charitable Giving in a Fully Replicated Economy

Gaube

2005

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractIn this paper, an economy is analyzed where one group of agents, the altruists, cares about the well-being of another group of agents, the recipients. It is asked how changes in the size of these groups affect the altruists' charitable giving in the Nash equilibrium. I show that a pure group size effect, i.e., a proportional expansion of both subgroups can lead to less free riding and to a lower degree of underprovision relative to the efficient level of charitable giving.

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The ?crowding-out? effect of governmental transfers on private charitable contributions

Cited by 259 publications

References 11 publications

Are church and state substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 welfare reform

Are church and state substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 welfare reform

Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity: Evidence from linear public goods games

Altruism and Charitable Giving in a Fully Replicated Economy

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