The Cuban missile crisis and intelligence performance

Blight, James G.; Welch, David A.

doi:10.1080/02684529808432498

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 22 publications

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“…During the Cuban Missile Crisis, different American agencies were producing intelligence products regarding Cuba. But, given the amount of secrecy and limited interaction between members of the intelligence community at the time, information was not shared between agencies that could have helped analysts craft products that in turn would have established American dominance in the region (Blight and Welch, 1998;Wirtz, 1998). A second example is that during air missions in Kosovo, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe made a snap decision in the absence of readily available intelligence to order a drone strike on possible enemy combatants (Woodcock, 2003, 134).…”

Section: Flexible Command Structuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Applying the Revolution in Military Affairs to Intelligence

Kurliak¹

2018

JICW

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This paper identifies how the concept of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' can be applied to the intelligence process to address the overabundance of information produced by contemporary technologies. Three tenets from the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' are examined as possible remedies for failings in the intelligence process. Drawing on previous intelligence failures, the case is made that applying the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' will improve the intelligence process and allow for agencies to stay on top of the large quantity of information they handle. The finding is that by incorporating these tenets, intelligence services can improve the quality of intelligence that they produce. Keywords: Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), intelligence, informationThe concept of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) goes back as early as the 1970s (Metz and Kievit, 1995), and theorizes that information technology is altering the "knowledge available to armed forces, and thus the nature of war" (Ferris, 2009, 455). RMA is based on an understanding that information gives forces an edge over their opponents, and the usage of technology allows this to happen at a faster pace than ever before (Lucas, 2010). The definition of RMA for this paper is adapted from Betz (2006) and Ferris (2009) to mean the usage of information technology by either state or non-state forces to achieve and maintain a force's dominance in warfare faster than their opponents can.The problem with RMA, however, is that there is now an overabundance of information and the current methods used to determine what is useful for commanders and decision-makers cannot keep up (Betz, 2006;Betz, 2008;Ferris, 2009). This represents an issue in the intelligence process. In response, the question has been asked, if there is a RMA relating to the way information and technology are changing war, can the same concept be applied to intelligence? This paper argues that the concept of RMA can be applied to intelligence to address the issue of information overabundance and the methods used to determine how useful information is. This can be accomplished by incorporating three elements into the intelligence process: flexible command

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Section: Flexible Command Structuresmentioning

confidence: 99%