The Cumulative Force of Analogies

Botting, David

doi:10.12775/llp.2017.011

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…David Botting, being a deductivist, has in several papers argued that all types of arguments  including arguments by analogy  can be reduced to deductive arguments [Botting 2012a[Botting ,b, 2014[Botting , 2016. However, after reading Juthe's 2015 paper, Botting was finally convinced that deductivism fails to account for complex argumentation by analogy [Botting 2017]. In previous publications [Juthe 2005[Juthe , 2009[Juthe , 2015[Juthe , 2016 Juthe has argued that analogy is a sui generis inference not reducible to deductive inference (or any other type of inference).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A defense of analogy inference as sui generis

Juthe¹

2019

LLP

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Accounts of analogical inference are usually categorized into four broad groups: abductive, deductive, inductive and sui generis. The purpose of this paper is to defend a sui generis model of analogical inference. It focuses on the sui generis account, as developed by Juthe [2005, 2009, 2015, 2016] and Botting's [2017] criticism of it. This paper uses the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation as the methodological framework for analyzing and reconstructing argumentation. The paper has two main points. First, that Juthe's arguments against a deductive interpretation of prima facie analogy argumentation remain unaffected by Botting's criticism, which means that many of the reasons against deductive reformulation of analogy argumentation still stand. The additional argument, which Botting himself brings up, that a deductive interpretation cannot account for the cumulative effect of analogies, just provides further reason to reject deductivism. The second main point of this paper is that an inductive interpretation of analogical inference also fails. There are constitutional differences between inductive and analogical inference that cannot be bridged. The result is a firm defense of the sui generis view of analogical inference.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A defense of analogy inference as sui generis

Juthe¹

2019

LLP

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John Woods y Brent Hudak: Por paridad de razonamiento

Delgado

2020

RIA

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Traducción al español del artículo publicado por John Woods y Brent Hudak en Informal Logic, Vol. 11, Nº 3, en 1989. Frente a las propuestas que interpretan el argumento por analogía en términos de semejanza de propiedades, los autores proponen aquí una concepción metaargumentativa, es decir, una en la que los objetos de comparación son argumentos. Esto les permite interpretar la noción de semejanza en términos de identidad de razones, dar cuenta de algunas características del argumento por analogía en oposición, por ejemplo, a la predicación analógica y explorar su dimensión dialéctica en la solución de lo que denominan un stand-off o punto muerto discursivo. La traducción se acompaña de una presentación del texto realizada por el traductor.

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The Cumulative Force of Analogies

Cited by 2 publications

References 12 publications

A defense of analogy inference as sui generis

A defense of analogy inference as sui generis

John Woods y Brent Hudak: Por paridad de razonamiento

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The Cumulative Force of Analogies

Cited by 2 publications

References 12 publications

­A defense of analogy inference as sui generis

­A defense of analogy inference as sui generis

John Woods y Brent Hudak: Por paridad de razonamiento

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A defense of analogy inference as sui generis

A defense of analogy inference as sui generis